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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
IV. COPYRIGHT, PATENT & TRADEMARK LAW
A. M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews: Extending Copyright
Protection for a Video Game's Audiovisual Work to the Underlying
Computer Program*
In 1980 Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976' (the
"1976 Act") to include copyright protection for computer
* A version of this article was submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Under the United States Constitution,
Congress has the power to promote the progress of science by granting an author exclusive
rights in the author's writings for a limited time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving
Congress power to create author's right to establish exclusive rights over writings). In 1790
Congress enacted the first copyright act in the United States. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); see FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMISSION ON NEW TEc-No-
LOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 35 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] (final report
of committee that Congress established to recommend new copyright provisions) (describing
Congressional enactment of 1790 Act). Since enacting the first copyright act, Congress
continuously has expanded the scope of copyright protection. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 3, 1831,
ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (extending copyright protection to musical compositions) (amended 1870);
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (extending copyright protection to dramatic
compositions) (amended 1870); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (extending copyright
protection to paintings and designs) (amended 1909); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075 (extending copyright protection to all writings of any author) (repealed 1976); see also
CONTU REPORT, supra, at 36-37 (describing Congress' progression in extending copyrightability
to different types of works). The Constitution provides that all writings of an author constitute
copyrightable subject matter. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Judicial decisions interpreting the
copyright power have construed the term "writings" very broadly. See, e.g., Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 563 n.17 (1973) (sound recording meets requirements of "writing");
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (motion pictures meet requirements of
"writing"); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (photographs
meet statutory defimition of "writing"). Congress, however, enacted the 1976 Copyright Act
(the "1976 Act") to provide protection for new forms of creative expression that future
scientific discoveries and technological developments might generate. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (1976 Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
51 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 HousE REPORT] (describing Congressional intent to protect devel-
oping technologies), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADrmN. NEws 5659, 5664.
In revising the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), Congress intended to allow the courts
to provide copyright protection for works developed in the future without requiring that
Congress revise the copyright law. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra, at 51 (describing Congress'
intent not to freeze subject matter of copyright). When Congress enacted the 1976 Act,
however, Congress did not intend to alter the basic principle of the 1909 Act that copyright
protection extends only to the expression of an idea and not to the actual idea. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1982) (copyright protection does not extend to any idea or concept); Copyright Act
of 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (imiting copyright protection to author's
writings) ( repealed by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982)); see also 1976 House REPORT, supra, at 56-
57 (evidencing Congressional intent to limit scope of copyright protection to expressions of
ideas). An author cannot stop a second author from creating a work that the second author
has based on the same idea as the original author's work if the second author expresses the
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programs.2 Although Congress intended the 1976 Act to extend copyright
work's idea in a different manner than the original author. See Atari, Inc. v. Amusement
World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981) (finding no infringement when author
copied idea but not expression). For example, in Mazer v. Stein the United States Supreme
Court considered whether a utilitarian object could receive copyright protection. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1954) (questioning whether utilitarian object can receive copyright
protection). In Mazer the creator of a statuette that businesses had sold as a lamp base brought
an action for copyright infringement against a party who copied the original creator's entire
lamp, including the design and artwork of the statuette lamp base. Id. at 202-04. The Mazer
court stated that a piece of work serving a utilitarian function also could constitute a work
of art. Id. at 218. The Mazer court reasoned that the design aspects of the statuette could
serve as one author's way of expressing the idea of a base of a table lamp. Id. The Mazer
court concluded, therefore, that the particular design of a lamp base could be copyrightable
as a work of art. Id. The Supreme Court warned, however, that the lamp base could receive
copyright protection only in the lamp base's form, and not in the lamp base's mechanical or
utilitarian aspects. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that a copyright protects a work only to
the extent that the work expresses an idea, and that protecting the expression of an idea
promotes progress by rewarding an author for that author's creative input while allowing
others to work and improve on the original idea. See id. at 217-18 (protecting expression
rather than idea promotes progress); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (179) (same); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (7th Cir.
1977) (same). When the idea of a work and the expression of a work's idea become
indistinguishable, no copyright protection can exist for the work. See Krofft Television, 562
F.2d at 1168 (no copyright protection exists for work when idea and expression inseparable
because such protection would give copyright holder monopoly on idea).
In considering the copyrightability of computer programs, courts have maintained the
Mazer rule by determining that a computer program copyright protects only the expression of
a program's idea. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1252-53 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer program copyright only protects expression of program's
idea), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.) (copyright protection for computer program extends only
to expression of program's idea), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Williams Elecs., Inc. v.
Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (only video game's form, rather
than video game itself, is copyrightable).
Although the 1976 Act allows courts to determine whether copyright protection should
exist for newly developed types of works, the 1976 Act requires that an author attempt to
register the work with the Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982) (requiring registration
of copyrights). Although copyright protection can exist for a work prior to registration with
the Copyright Office, an author cannot sue another party for copyright infringement until the
author has attempted to register the work. See id. § 408(a) (requiring attempt at registration
before beginning legal proceedings); cf. id. § 405(a) (voiding copyright protection of unregistered
work when author fails to take specific precautions to protect work). To register a work with
the Copyright Office under the 1976 Act, an author must deposit with the Copyright Office
certain copies of the work for, which the author seeks copyright registration. See id. § 408(b)
(detailing specific depository requirements for registering various types of works). The Register
of Copyrights, who serves as head of the Copyright Office, can establish additional regulations
that supplement the requirements of the 1976 Act to divide different types of works into
different classes for purposes of deposit and registration. See id. § 408(c) (describing powers
of Register of Copyrights to establish regulations regarding registration procedures).
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (amending 1976 Act by adding definition of "computer
program"). The 1980 Amendment expressly included computer programs as copyrightable
subject matter by adding a definition of "computer program" to the definitional section of
the 1976 Act. See id. (defining "computer program"). Congress defined a computer program
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protection to computer programs, the 1976 Act did not provide suffi-
as a set of instructions that a person has designed to accomplish a certain result through direct
or indirect use in a computer. Id.; see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing legislative history leading to Congressional
definition of computer program), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Il. 1983) (defining "computer program").
Congress' definition of a computer program in the 1980 Amendment, however, did not
end legal disputes over the copyrightability of computer programs. See Apple, 714 F.2d at
1246-49 (involving dispute over extent of protection given to computer programs). Arguments
against the copyrightability of computer programs have focused criticisms in two principal
areas. First, opponents of the copyrightability of computer programs have argued that the
programs act as mechanical or utilitarian devices, which are uncopyrightable. See id. at 1249-
54 (discussing argument that computer programs are utilitarian devices). Generally, two main
classes of computer programs exist. See Brett and Perry, Introduction to THE LEGAL PROThCTION
OF COMPUTER SoFrvARw 2, 2 (1981). The two classes of computer programs are the source
code or application program, and the object code or control program. Id. Source code
programs allow computer users to receive specific output data after entering specific input
data. Id. Object code programs, however, are translations of the source code that operate the
specific mechanizations of the computer. Id. Object code programs appear in a binary number
form so that the machine can read the program. See Brooks, Object Code in ROM: Is It
Really a Problem?, in PLI, COMPUTER LAW INsTrTuTE 335, 340 (1983) (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks and Literary Property Handbook Series No. 166) (explaining object code form).
While some authorities initially argued that copyright protection should never extend to either
source code or object code computer programs, others argued that at a minimum, object code
programs should not receive copyright protection because object code programs act solely as
utilitarian, mechanical devices, See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv, L. REv, 281, 346-50
(1970) (arguing that copyright protection should not extend to computer programs); Brooks,
supra, at 346 (explaining rationale for arguments that object code programs should not receive
copyright protection because memory devices are utilitarian devices); infra note 20 (defining
memory device). The 1976 Act extends copyright protection only to an expression of an idea
rather than the idea itself. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright protects only expression of
idea); see also supra note I and accompanying text (discussing idea-expression dichotomy).
Authorities arguing against the copyrightability of machine-readable object code computer
programs have stated that because of the utilitarian nature of object code programs, such
programs could not express an idea. See Brooks, supra, at 346, 350-51 (discussing argument
that object code in memory device is machine part and therefore not copyrightable). Rather,
the authorities argued, object code programs constitute an actual idea, and thus are uncopy-
rightable. See id. (discussing argument that memory device is not copyrightable). In recent
decisions, however, courts have extended copyright protection only to the program, and not
to the underlying utilitarian devices. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1982) (utilitarian devices cannot receive copyright protection). Copyright
protection, therefore, still may extend to object code programs because the actual program
arguably does not function as a utilitarian device. Id.; see Brooks, supra, at 363-66 (supporting
copyrightability of object code in memory device).
Advocates of the second argument against the copyrightability of object code programs
assume that a copyrightable work must be in a human readable form. See White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1908) (denying copyright protection for
perforated roll of music that ordinary person could not read); see also Brooks, supra, at 346-
47 (describing White-Smith argument that copyrightable works must be in human readable
form). In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a copyright protected a work that was in a form that an ordinary person
could not read. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908). The
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ciently for such protection. 3 The 1980 amendment to the 1976 Act (the
"1980 Amendment"), however, codified Congress' intent to validate the
copyrightability of computer programs by expressly defining computer
White-Smith case involved a musical composition that the plaintiff had published in the form
of sheet music. Id. The defendant had reproduced the notes of the sheet music on a perforated
roll of music for a player piano. Id. The Supreme Court decided that the perforated roll could
not act as a "copy" of the musical composition because the perforated roll did not constitute
a human-readable medium. Id. at 12, 18; see also Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,
480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (copyright protection on computer program does not
extend to machine-readable object code program), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1980). By enacting the 1976 Act, however, Congress specifically intended to terminate the
artificial rule that White-Smith expounded. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (allowing copyright
protection for any work which is original expression in fixed medium that person can reproduce
with aid of machine); 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing Congress' intent
to abrogate White-Smith rule). Subsequent to the 1980 Amendment, courts have upheld the
copyright protection of an object code program as a copy of the source code program. See
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(translating source code into another computer language should not create loophole in copyright
protection); see also Apple, 714 F.2d at 1248 (copyright on computer program protects object
code); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685, F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1983) (copyright
on computer program protects source code and object code). See generally Brooks, supra, at
356-63 (denouncing argument that inability of humans to read object code defeats copyright-
ability- of object code programs); Kindermann, A Review of Suggested Systems for the
Protection of Computer Software, in Tim LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SorrwARE 139,
140-41 (1981) (supporting copyright protection for object code programs).
3. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 51, 54 (evidencing Congress' intent to
protect computer programs through copyrights as literary works). The legislative history of
the 1976 Act illustrates that by enacting the 1976 Act, Congress intended to allow courts to
apply copyright protection to new forms of works that technological advances created. See id.
at 51 (1976 Act does not limit scope of copyrightable subject matter to existing forms of
copyrightable works). The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), which Congress established in 1974 to study the problems of adequately
protecting new technological creations, found that the 1976 Act allowed copyright protection
for computer programs. CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 8, 40. In 1964, before Congress
validated copyrights on computer programs, the Register of Copyrights (the "Register")
announced that authors of computer programs could register computer programs with the
Register's office. Id. at 38; see supra note 1 (describing function of Register of Copyrights
and Copyright Office). Because pre-1976 judicial precedent required that copyrightable works
appear in a human-readable form, the Register acknowledged some doubt about the copyright-
ability of machine-readable computer programs. CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 38; see
supra note 2 (discussing rule under White-Smith and 1909 Act that copyright protection
extended only to works in human-readable form). The Register, however, allowed copyright
registration for programs when authors had deposited human-readable copies of the program
with the Register's office and published the program under the 1909 Copyright Act. See
CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 38; Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078-
79 (1909) (describing 1909 Act's deposit requirements) (repealed 1976). The 1976 Act, however,
abandoned the copyright requirements of prior publication and human readability. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (establishing copyright protection for original work that author has
fixed in tangible material); CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 38 (recognizing that 1976 Act
does not require prior publication or human readability to establish copyright's validity); see
also infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for copyright protection).
[Vol. 44:505
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programs as copyrightable subject matter. 4 Copyrights on computer pro-
grams, however, generally do not protect the computer program's audi-
ovisual, or audiovisual display. 5 Copying the audiovisual display that a
computer program creates has caused particular problems for authors of
video games6 because new authors successfully can copy a video game
audiovisual without infringing the computer program copyright by writing
an entirely new program that will recreate the same audiovisual that the
original computer program created. 7 Although the 1976 Act establishes
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (including computer programs as copyrightable subject matter);
see H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 HousE
REPORT] (describing Congress' intent to clarify copyright law with respect to computer soft-
ware), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6460, 6482. CONTU recommended
that Congress amend the 1976 Act to clarify Congress' intent to protect computer programs
through copyrights. CONTU REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. After Congress enacted the 1976
Act, confusion continued to exist over the copyrightability of computer programs. See Note,
Copyright Protection for Video Games: The Courts in the Pac-Man Maze, 32 CI.Ev. ST. L.
REv. 531, 538 n.46 (1983) (describing conflict in Congress' stated intentions in passing 1976
Act). In enacting the 1976 Act, Congress expressed an intent to preserve the copyright protection
standards that existed in the 1909 Act and copyright common law. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 57; see supra note 1 (discussing requirement that copyright protects expression of
idea). Congress, however, also had expressed an intent to dispose of the human readability
requirement that White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. imposed on copyrightable
works. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 1 (requiring human readability in any copyrightable
work); 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54 (describing Congress' intent to dispose of
human readability requirement); supra note 2 (discussing White-Smith case). Although the
1976 Act removed the human readability requirement, CONTU recommended that Congress
clarify Congress' intent regarding the copyrightability of computer programs. CONTU REPORT,
supra note 1, at 2; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring only originality and fixation for
work to qualify for copyright protection). Compare Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group,
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (finding no copyright protection for
computer program in machine-readable object code), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir 1980) with Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (copyright protection extends to machine-readable object code).
5. See Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Dist. Corp., No. 86-128-A,
slip op. at - (N.D. Ga. March 31, 1987) (computer program copyright does not protect
audiovisual); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (limiting
protection of computer program copyright); infra note 6 (defining video game audiovisual);
infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text (discussing protection that computer program
copyright and audiovisual copyright provide). But see Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (computer program copyright protects
audiovisual).
6. See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 853 (2d Cir. 1982) (defining "video
games"). In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit defined "video games" as computers that a person can program to create
cartoons on a television screen. Id. A video game player can control the movement of the
cartoons on the television screen. Id. The pictures or sequences of pictures that appear during
the play of video games plus the sounds that emanate from the video game console constitute
a video game's audiovisual. Id. at 854.
7. See Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (person can
recreate video game audiovisual by writing new and independent program); Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. at 749 (describing possibility of infringing audiovisual copyright but not computer
1987]
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that audiovisual works8 are proper subjects for copyright, 9 neither the
1976 Act nor the 1980 Amendment specifically provides for individual
copyright protection of the video game audiovisual."0
Before courts first interpreted the meaning of "audiovisual works"
program copyright). Computer program copyright holders seeking to protect video games have
not found protection for the audiovisual portion of the games in the computer program
copyright. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749. When infringing authors create a new computer
program which replicates an existing computer audiovisual without copying the audiovisual's
original underlying program, the problem of "knock-off" exists. Stem, 669 F.2d at 855; see
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749 (duplicating video screens creates "knock-off").
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining audiovisual work). The 1976 Act defines
audiovisual works as "works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices . .. , together with accompanying
sounds, if any. . . ." Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982) (including audiovisual works as copyrightable subject
matter); see supra note 8 (defining audiovisual works).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see Jones, Video Game Litigation
and the 1976 Copyright Act: The Ideas of Games, the Expression of Aliens and the Underlying
Computer Software, in 1 PLI, SorTwARi PROTECTION AND MARKTING: COMPUTER PROoRAMS
AND DATA BASES; VIDEO GA.ms AND MoTIoN PICTURES 223, 230 (M. Goldberg ed. 1983) (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Handbook Series No. 159) (current
copyright statutes do not address specifically issue of video game audiovisual copyrightability).
Courts have determined that the appearance and the sounds that persons associate with
a video game audiovisual display constitute an audiovisual work under the statutory definition
of the 1976 Act. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
615 (7th Cir.) (protecting sights and sounds of video game audiovisual as audiovisual work),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Stern, 669 F.2d at 855 (sights and sounds of video game
registered with Copyright Office are audiovisual work); Williams Elecs., Inc. v: Bally Mfg.
Co., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (definition of audiovisual work includes shapes,
sizes, colors, sequences, arrangements, and sounds); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981) (defining video game as audiovisual work); see infra
note 20 (listing decisions that uphold copyrightability of video game audiovisual).
Although courts have determined that video game audiovisuals meet the 1976 Act's
definition of "audiovisual work," video game audiovisuals do not appear immediately to fall
within the statutory definition of "audiovisual works." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining
"audiovisual work"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir.)
(describing initial problems with finding that video game audiovisuals meet 1976 Act's definition
of audiovisual work), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); supra note 8 (defining audiovisual
work); infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (discussing problems that courts had in finding
that video game audiovisuals meet definition of "audiovisual works"). The phrase "series of
related images" in the 1976 Act's definition of an audiovisual work could refer to a requirement
that an audiovisual must display a set of images in a definite fixed sequence. See Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'I, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir.) (describing argument that video
game falls to qualify as "series of related images" under 1976 Act's definition of audiovisual
work), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). Because player input varies the recalled sequences,
video game screens do not appear immediately to meet the 1976 Act's requirement that a set
of images of an audiovisual work appear in a fixed sequence. See kramsky, The Video Game:
Our Legal System Grapples with a Social Phenomenon, 64 J. PAT. OFT. Soc'y 335, 343 (1982)
(describing argument that player input defeats fixation). Courts, however, have construed the
definition of "audiovisual work" more broadly to refer to any set of images that an author
has displayed as some kind of unit, and, therefore, have determined that a video game
audiovisual is an "audiovisual work" under the 1976 Act. See, e.g., Midway, 704 F.2d at
1011 (finding copyrightability despite player input); Williams, 685 F.2d at 874 (finding repetitive
[Vol. 44:505
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under the 1976 Act, the issue of whether video game audiovisuals could
receive copyright protection was unclear." Like the Copyright Act of 1909,12
the 1976 Act provides copyright protection for the expression of an idea,
but not for the actual idea.' 3 Although courts have found that certain design
aspects of video game audiovisual displays are copyrightable as an expres-
sion of a game's idea,"' the 1976 Act also requires that audiovisual works
satisfy tests for originality'" and fixation 6 to qualify for copyright
sequence copyrightable despite player participation); Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (dismissing argument
that player input defeats fixation); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "audiovisual
work"); Note, supra note 4, at 559-61 (describing courts' reasoning in decisions over player
participation issue). Congress intended to construe liberally the definition of audiovisual works.
1976 House REPORT, supra note 1, at 51; see supra note 6 (discussing early questions about
copyrightability of video game audiovisuals); infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing requirements that video game audiovisuals must meet for copyrightability); see also
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 627-28 (7th Cir.
1982) (giving historical background of expansive interpretation of term "audiovisual work").
11. See infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text (discussing initial legal obstacles to
providing copyright protection for video game audiovisuals).
12. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (providing no copyright protection for ideas); supra
note 1 (discussing requirement that copyrights protect expressions of ideas rather than actual
ideas).
14. See, e.g., Atari, 672 F.2d at 615 (pattern and design of video game audiovisual
copyrightable as expression of game's idea); Bally, 568 F. Supp. at 1278 (particular form of
game's audiovisual copyrightable as expression of game's idea); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-
America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 148 (D. N.J. 1982) (same). See generally supra note 1
(explaining that copyrights protect only expressions of ideas).
Although the 1976 Act establishes that copyrights protect expressions of ideas rather
than actual ideas, courts have not delineated a precise standard for determining the degree of
expression necessary to receive copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (protecting
expression rather than idea); Stern, 669 F.2d at 857 (leaving open question of when expression
may be too minimal to be copyrightable). Courts have applied different standards in determining
whether a particular expression in a video game audiovisual display is copyrightable. Compare
Atari, 672 F.2d at 618 (finding that copyrightable expression existed after examining overall
similarities between two video game audiovisuals) with Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. at
229-30 (finding that uncopyrightable idea existed after analyzing overall dissimilarities between
two video game audiovisuals).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring originality in copyrighted works). Like the
1909 Act, the 1976 Act's requirement that an audiovisual be original to qualify for copyright
protection does not demand that a work exhibit strikingly unique or novel characteristics. See
id. (requiring originality in copyrighted works); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909) (repealed 1976); see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
103 (2d Cir. 1951) (describing standards for originality). In finding originality in a work under
the 1976 Act, courts rarely prohibit more than actual copying of another party's expression.
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951); see Note,
Federal Copyright Law in the Computer Era: Protection for Authors of Video Games, 7 U.
PUGET SouND L. REv. 425, 429 (1984) (video games easily can meet requirement for originality
because of 1976 Act's low standard for originality). Two different works with identical
expressions both can receive copyright protection if different authors independently created
each work and did not copy one work from the other work. See Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103
(allowing copyright protection for independently created, uncopied works); Knickerbocker Toy
Co. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (D. N.H. 1982) (same).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "fixed" element). The 1976 Act requires that
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protection. 7 Specifically, the 1976 Act provides copyright protection only for
original works of authorship that constitute "fixed" elements in a tangible
material.I8 Initially, experts questioned whether video game audiovisuals could
meet the fixation requirement because of the transitory, intangible nature of
video game audiovisual displays.' 9 Recent court decisions, however, have upheld
the validity of video game audiovisual copyrights by finding that a video
game audiovisual meets the 1976 Act's fixation requirement in the video
game's memory device (the "ROM"). 20 Courts upholding the validity of
an audiovisual establish fixation in a tangible medium of expression from which a person can
reproduce or perceive the audiovisual either directly or with the aid of a machine. Id. § 102(a).
Fixation in a tangible medium of expression results when the embodiment of the work in a
copy is sufficiently permanent to allow a person to perceive or reproduce the work for a
period of more than transitory duration. Id. § 101. Although Congress established that a
work's embodiment must occur in a tangible medium of expression to satisfy the 1976 Act's
fixation requirement, a person does not have to reproduce the work directly from the tangible
medium, but may reproduce the work with the aid of a machine. See id. (defining "copy" as
object from which person can reproduce original work either directly or with machine's aid).
The 1976 Act also allows courts to protect newly developed types of works by allowing courts
to extend copyright protection to works that an author has embodied in a tangible medium.
See id. (extending copyrightability to works meeting fixation and originality requirements).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982) (requiring fixation and originality for audiovisual
to receive copyright protection). Prior to the 1976 Act, copyright law did not require clearly
that a copyrightable work constitute a fixed element in a tangible medium. See CONTU
REP oRT, supra note 1, at 17-18 (discussing requirements of 1909 Act). Under the 1909 Act
Congress required that an author publish a work in a human-readable medium to establish
copyrightability. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 16-18 (human readability of work necessary for
valid copyright); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (describing 1909
Act's copyright deposit requirements) (repealed 1976). The 1976 Act, however, eliminated the
requirements of prior publication and human readability. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)
(requiring only fixation and originality in copyrightable works).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (describing
fixation and originality requirements of 1976 Act).
19. See Jones, supra note 10, at 230-31 (describing courts' early reluctance to find
fixation in video game audiovisuals because of transiency of video game audiovisuals). The
legislative history of the 1976 Act mandates exclusion from copyrightability of purely transient
or evanescent reproductions. See 1976 House REPORT, supra note 1, at 53 (discussing Congress'
intent to exclude evanescent images from copyrightability). But see infra note 20 and accom-
panying text (discussing validity of audiovisual copyrights).
20. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874-75 (video game audiovisual copyrights valid because
audiovisual's permanent embodiment in game's memory devices satisfies statutory definition
of fixation); Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56 (establishing that video game audiovisual can receive
copyright protection because of fixation in memory device); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,
543 F. Supp. 466, 479-80 (D. Neb. 1981) (memory device meets fixation requirement because
1976 Act contains no restrictions on type of object necessary for fixation); see also United
States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613, 614 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that courts consistently hold
video game audiovisual subject to copyright); Atari, 672 F.2d at 615 (finding repetitive sequence
of video game's sights and sounds copyrightable); Bally, 568 F. Supp. at 1277 (finding
registration of audiovisual copyright evidence of copyright's validity); Strohon, 564 F. Supp.
at 746 (video game images copyrightable); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 125, 139 (D. N.J. 1982) (video game authors have unquestionable right to copyright
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the video game audiovisual copyright, however, have found difficulty in
determining the extent to which the audiovisual copyright protects the video
game. 21 In M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. v. AndrewsP the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the copyright
protection that the 1976 Act affords to the owner of an audiovisual copyright
for a video game extended beyond the audiovisual image to the underlying
computer program.23
Kramer involved a dispute over the production and marketing rights for
a computerized video game called "Hi-Lo Double Up Joker Poker" (Hi-
audiovisuals); Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. at 226 (audiovisual work copyrightable).
Although numerous types of memory devices exist, most all video games utilize read-only
memory devices (the "ROM") or variations of the ROM. See Stern, 669 F.2d at 854 n. I
(describing ROM); Brooks, supra note 2, at 339 (most video games use ROMs). The ROM
consists of a semiconductor chip that a manufacturer has incorporated into the circuitry of a
computer. See Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243 (explaining ROM). In the ROM's early development,
manufacturers placed a computer program into the ROM during the manufacturing process.
See Brooks, supra note 2, at 339 (tracing development of ROMs). Once the ROM contained
information, programmers could not alter any infornrration in the ROM. Id. Although recent
developments allow programmers to change the information that the ROM contains, the slow
speed of altering the ROM's information makes changing the embedded information impract-
ical. Id. As a result, the ROM is a virtually permanent storage device. See Apple, 714 F.2d
at 1243 (describing permanence of information in ROM). See generally A. LippErr, THE
ARcErrEc UPE OF SMALL COMPUTER SYSTEMS § 1.4.6, at 12-13 (1979) (providing descriptions
of ROM and other types of computer memory devices).
Although courts have upheld copyright protection for video game audiovisuals because
of a video game audiovisual's fixation in the ROM, copyright protection does not extend to
the ROM. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 364-65 (ROM is machine part that is not copyrightable).
But see Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749 (conceding copyright protection to ROM as computer
program). The ROM is a piece of "firmware" that embodies mechanical attributes of computer
hardware and instruction attributes of computer software. See Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 751
(describing ROM). Programmers use ROMs to perform mechanical, utilitarian functions. See
Williams, 685 F.2d at 875 (ROMs are utilitarian devices). No copyright protection extends
from a video game audiovisual copyright to ROMs because a utilitarian device cannot express
the video game's idea. See id. (finding that audiovisual copyright does not restrict use of
ROM); 1 M. NnMER, NMMER oN CoPryi'nTr § 2.18[F], at 2-208 (1986) (no copyright protection
for mechanical devices). But see Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§
901-914 (Supp. III 1985) (providing limited semicopyright protection to form of semiconductor
chips); R. NDMR, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1.05 (1985) (discussing requirements
for semiconductor chip protection and scope of protection for semiconductor chips under
Semiconductor Chip Act of 1984). The uncopyrightable nature of ROMs, however, has not
affected the copyrightability of video game audiovisuals. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 875 (finding
that ROM embodies audiovisual only for fixation purposes). The 1976 Act does not establish
requirements regarding the type of material that must embody a copyrightable work for fixation
purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring only that fixation occur in tangible medium
of expression).
21. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 616 (finding difficulty in defining scope of audiovisual
copyright protection); infra notes 132-53 (discussing problems in demarcating scope of video
game audiovisual copyright protection).
22. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
23. Id. at 442.
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Lo). 24 The plaintiff, M. Kramer Manufacturing Company (Kramer), acquired
rights to an electronic card game based on draw poker (Draw Poker I).2s
Kramer began selling a modified version of Draw Poker I in November
1981. 26 One of Kramer's employees continued modifying the game until the
game evolved into Hi-Lo. 27
The defendant, Andrews, purchased numerous Hi-Lo games from Kra-
mer through Andrews' video game distribution business. 28 By copying the
ROM29 of a copy of Kramer's Hi-Lo game, Andrews' employee developed
a game substantially identical to Hi-Lo.3 0 The ROM from which Andrews
copied the Hi-Lo game contained the program that created Kramer's Hi-
Lo game audiovisual a. 3 Andrews specifically chose to copy a ROM that did
not contain Kramer's copyright notice. 32 Additionally, the cabinet containing
24. Id. at 425.
25. Id. at 426. In Kramer the president of M. Kramer Manufacturing Co. (Kramer),
Michael Kramer, had helped to create the original version of the Hi-Lo game, Draw Poker I,
as an employee of LGF Corporation (LGF). Id. at 425. Embodying a variation of the card
game blackjack, the audiovisual of Draw Poker I displayed five cards. Id. LGF owned all
rights to the original production model, Draw Poker I. Id. at 426. Mr. Kramer continued to
help modify the electronic poker game as an employee of LGF and ultimately created Draw
Poker Il. Id. Draw Poker II differed from Draw Poker I because Draw Poker II contained a
different circuit board than Draw Poker I, a new "attract mode" audiovisual to entice
customers to play the game, and a new "play mode" audiovisual that placed jokers on the
screen during the game's play. Id. Draw Poker II did not constitute a new, independently
created work, but evolved from changes in Draw Poker I. Id. LGF transferred all rights in
Draw Poker II to the plaintiff, Kramer, during the transformation of Draw Poker I into Draw
Poker II. Id. Kramer, however, did not register LGF's transfer of rights in Draw Poker II
with the Copyright Office at that time. See id. at 429 (discussing Kramer's later registration
of letter transferring rights in Draw Poker II to Kramer); infra notes 34, 37-38 (same).
26. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 426.
27. Id. at 427. In Kramer the Kramer employee who modified the Draw Poker II game
to create Hi-Lo was Robert Battagiia. Id. at 426. Battaglia also assisted in creating Draw
Poker I, the original production model of the poker game from which both Draw Poker II
and Hi-Lo evolved. Id. The additions evident in the Hi-Lo audiovisual, which neither Draw
Poker I nor Draw Poker II possessed, included a "hi-lo double up feature" in attract mode
and a "flashing card feature" in play mode. See id. at 426-27 (describing concept of Hi-Lo
game).
28. Id. at 427.
29. See supra note 20 (defining ROM).
30. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428. In Kramer the defendant Andrews employed an electronics
engineer to copy Kramer's Hi-Lo game. Id. The engineer refused to copy a printed circuit
board from Kramer's Hi-Lo game, which Kramer had marked with the words "Copyright
Applied for M. Kramer Manufacturing." Id. The electronics engineer, however, copied a
printed circuit board and memory devices from a copy of Kramer's Hi-Lo game that a different
company had distributed. Id.; see infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing another
company's distribution of Kramer's Hi-Lo game). The engineer modified parts of the copied
Hi-Lo game by changing some words in the audiovisual display and the design on some of
the cards. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428.
31. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428; see supra note 20 (discussing function of ROM).
32. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428; see supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing
Andrews' knowledge of faulty copyright notice on original Hi-Lo ROM). In Kramer Andrews'
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the Hi-Lo game displayed the same name as Kramer's game."
When Kramer began selling Hi-Lo in November 1981, another company,
SMS Manufacturing Corporation (SMS), also began selling and distributing
the same Hi-Lo game.14 In March 1983 Kramer registered a copyright on
the audiovisual of Fi-Lo.3 1 Prior to Kramer's copyright application, how-
ever, SMS already had registered copyrights on Hi-Lo's underlying computer
program.3 6 As a result, SMS and Kramer held separate copyright registrations
on Hi-Lo's computer program and audiovisual display.37 In February 1983
SMS sued Kramer for copyright infringement of SMS' copyright in the Hi-
Lo computer program.38 Kramer and SMS subsequently reached a settlement
agreement in which SMS gave Kramer the right to sue Andrews for in-
fringement of SMS' copyright in the computer program. 39 Additionally, the
employee initially refused to copy a ROM from Kramer's game, which carried a defective but
visible notice of copyright. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428. Andrews' employee agreed to copy the
ROM only when Andrews presented a copy of Kramer's game that did not display a copyright
notice. Id.
33. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429.
34. Id. at 427. In Kramer Kramer's president once had formed another distribution
company with the president of SMS. Id. at 426. Both Kramer's president and SMS' president
had access to Hi-Lo. Id. Both Kramer and SMS sold Hi-Lo to consumers. Id. Although LGF
had transferred all copyright rights in Draw Poker II to Kramer by letter, neither Kramer nor
SMS had registered Hi-Lo with the Copyright Office prior to marketing Hi-Lo. Id.; see supra
note 25 and accompanying text (discussing LGF's transfer of rights in Draw Poker II to
Kramer).
35. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 429. In Kramer SMS obtained copyright registrations in the computer programs
underlying Hi-Lo in October 1982. Id. at 428. Kramer applied for copyright registration of
Hi-Lo's audiovisual work in March 1983. Id. Although the Copyright Office registered a later
version of Hi-Lo (Model III) as a derivative work, the Copyright Office initially rejected
Kramer's application to register the Hi-Lo audiovisual. Id.; see infra note 90 (defining derivative
work). The Copyright Office initially found that the Hi-Lo audiovisual was too similar to
Model III's audiovisual to receive additional copyright protection. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429.
After Kramer's attorney certified that the Hi-Lo audiovisual acted as a new compilation, the
Copyright Office registered Model III as a compilation of Hi-Lo and an early version of Hi-
Lo. Id.; see infra note 90 (defining compilation). The Copyright Office then registered the Hi-
Lo audiovisual as a compilation of earlier works. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428.
38. SMS Mfg. Corp. v. M. Kramer Mfg. Co., No. 83-554 (D.N.J. filed February 16,
1983). After SMS filed suit against Kramer in February 1983, Kramer filed with the Copyright
Office LGF's contract transferring to Kramer all rights to Draw Poker II. Kramer, 783 F.2d
at 429; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing process of Kramer's copyright
registration). In March 1983, Kramer obtained copyright registration on the Hi-Lo audiovisual.
Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429. After March 1983, Kramer and SMS separately held copyright
registrations on different components of Hi-Lo. See id. (Kramer owned copyright registration
on Hi-Lo audiovisual while SMS owned copyright registration on Hi-Lo computer program).
39. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429. In Kramer Kramer and SMS executed a settlement agreement
in May 1983. Id. The agreement provided that Kramer and SMS would cross-license each
other to use the copyrights of all the versions of the draw poker video games existing at the
time of the agreement. Id. Additionally, Kramer and SMS agreed not to authorize any third
party to manufacture a version of the draw poker games or to distribute any draw poker
games that neither Kramer nor SMS had manufactured. Id. Finally, SMS agreed to give
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settlement agreement maintained Kramer's right to sue for infringement of
Kramer's copyright in the Hi-Lo audiovisual work °
After reaching the settlement agreement with SMS, Kramer brought suit
in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina,
alleging that Andrews had infringed Kramer's copyrights in Hi-Lo's com-
puter program and audiovisual. 41 In addition to the copyright infringement
claim, Kramer asserted a claim of trade dress infringement against Andrews
under section 43(a) of the Federal Trademark Act.4 2 Finally, Kramer charged
Andrews with unfair competition in violation of the common law.43 The
district court found for the defendant Andrews on several alternative hold-
ings.44 In considering whether Andrews had infringed the Hi-Lo audiovisual
copyright, the district court found that Hi-Lo's audiovisual could not hold
a valid copyright. 45 The district court then concluded that even if the Hi-
Kramer the exclusive right to bring suit against Andrews for copyright infringement of the
Hi-Lo computer program. Id.
40. Id. at 429; see supra note 39 (discussing settlement agreement between Kramer and
SMS).
41. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429. In Kramer Kramer claimed that Andrews had infringed
the copyrights of Hi-Lo's computer program and audiovisual. Id. Kramer, however, attached
to Kramer's complaint a copy of the copyright registration covering only the audiovisual. Id.
Two days after Kramer filed suit against Andrews, the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina entered a temporary restraining order preventing Andrews from
manufacturing or distributing any video card game that embodied Hi-Lo's computer program
or audiovisual, contained Hi-Lo's features, or used artwork and console configurations, similar
to Hi-Lo's artwork and console configuration. Id. at 430. After a subsequent hearing, however,
the district court dissolved the restraining order. Id. After a trial without a jury, the district
court issued an unpublished opinion finding for Andrews on all counts. Id.
42. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429-30; see Federal Trademark Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1983) (prohibiting infringement of work's trade dress); infra note 84-88 (discussing
trade dress). In Kramer, as a part of Kramer's trade dress infringement claim, Kramer alleged
that Andrews had copied the "distinctive art work" on the front glass panel of Hi-Lo and
the "configuration of the console" embodying Hi-Lo. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429-30. Addition-
ally, Kramer alleged that Andrews used the name "Hi-Lo Double Up Joker Poker" on
Andrews' copy of the Hi-Lo game. Id.
43. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 429-30. The Kramer court did not address the district court's
treatment of Kramer's unfair competition claim. See id. at 431 (omitting unfair competition
claim from discussion of district court's findings).
44. See id. at 430-31 (discussing district court opinion); infra notes 45-50 and accom-
panying text (discussing district court's decision and reasoning concerning Kramer's claims).
45. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 430. In finding that no copyrightable material existed in the
Hi-Lo audiovisual work, the district court in Kramer first reasoned that only previously
nonpublic material could hold a valid copyright. Id. The court excluded from copyright
protection all material that Kramer had published in prior works, and limited any possible
copyright protection to previously unpublished elements that Kramer added to Hi-Lo. Id. The
court determined that in previous versions of the draw poker games, Kramer had released
publicly all but one aspect of the material that Hi-Lo contained, which was the "flashing
card" feature. Id. The "flashing card" feature involved a series of cards that flash in rapid
succession. See id. (describing "flashing card" feature). The court found, however, that the
Hi-Lo "flashing card" feature constituted merely an idea rather than an expression of an
idea. Id. The court found that the flashing card feature alone could not receive copyright
protection because the flashing card feature was an uncopyrightable idea. Id.; see supra note
I (discussing requirement that copyright protects only expressions of ideas).
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Lo audiovisual display possessed a valid copyright, Kramer's failure to affix
proper copyright notice on the Hi-Lo games that Kramer had distributed
to the public forfeited the audiovisual copyright's validity. 46 The district
court concluded further that even if no forfeiture occurred, no infringement
of Kramer's Hi-Lo audiovisual copyright resulted from Andrews' copying
of the Hi-Lo video game.47 After finding that no infringement resulted, the
district court held that even if Andrews had infringed Kramer's audiovisual
copyright, liability for infringement did not extend to Andrews because
Andrews did not receive proper notice of Kramer's copyright on the Hi-Lo
audiovisual work. 48 Finally, after rejecting Kramer's arguments that Andrews
had infringed Kramer's Hi-Lo audiovisual copyright, the district court also
rejected Kramer's claim of trade dress infringement. 49 Relying on its findings
that Andrews had not infringed Kramer's copyright or trade dress, the
district court dismissed Kramer's claims. 50
46. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 430. The district court in Kramer found that the owner of a
copyright forfeits the copyright by failing to affix proper copyright notice on a copyrighted
work. Id. at 431. The court maintained that because Kramer had added notice only to new
Hi-Lo games, Kramer had not made reasonable efforts to correct the omission of proper
copyright notice. Id. The court found that reasonable efforts would have included affixing
notice to distributors' copies of Hi-Lo games when Kramer discovered the omission of notice.
Id. Kramer, however, had not affixed notice to Hi-Lo games in the possession of distributors.
Id.
47. Id. at 431. The district court in Kramer concluded that Andrews did not infringe
Kramer's Hi-Lo audiovisual copyright because no substantial similarity existed between Kra-
mer's and Andrews' Hi-Lo games. Id. The court held that because Andrews had modified the
Hi-Lo audiovisual, insufficient similarity existed between the two video games to establish
copyright infringement. Id.
48. Id. In Kramer the district court concluded that if Andrews had infringed the Hi-Lo
audiovisual copyright, the infringement was an innocent infringement. Id. The court found
that an innocent infringement results when the infringing author has no notice of the existence
of a copyright that protects the infringed work. See id. (innocent infringement exists because
Kramer failed to place proper notice on audiovisual and computer copyrights on games). The
court found that an innocent infringement is not actionable. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982)
(innocent infringement provides no cause of action).
49. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 447. The district court in Kramer found that because no
secondary meaning had attached to the design of Hi-Lo's console, Andrews did not infringe
Hi-Lo's trade dress. Id. The court determined that under the Federal Trademark Act (the
"Lanham Act"), Kramer could establish that Andrews had infringed Hi-Lo's trade dress only
if Kramer could show that a secondary meaning had attached to Hi-Lo. Id.; see Federal
Trademark Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1983) (providing requirements for trade
dress infringement). The court found that secondary meaning in a video game console means
that the public recognizes that a particular console houses a particular video game that a
particular party creates. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 447. The court determined that secondary
meaning acts as a prerequisite to proof of proprietary rights in a work. Id. Additionally, the
district court applied the secondary meaning rationale to Hi-Lo's name and glasswork. Id.
The district court found that because no secondary meaning had attached to Hi-Lo's name or
glasswork, no trade dress infringement of Hi-Lo's name or glasswork occurred. Id.
50. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 431. In addition to dismissing Kramer's claims of copyright
and trade dress infringement, the district court in Kramer held that Andrews had not breached
a distributorship agreement that Kramer and Andrews previously had created. Id. at 425 n.l.
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On appeal the Fourth Circuit considered whether Kramer possessed a
valid audiovisual copyright, whether Kramer liad forfeited Hi-Lo's audio-
visual copyright, whether Andrews had infringed Kramer's audiovisual copy-
right, whether Andrews innocently had infringed Kramer's audiovisual
copyright, and whether Andrews had infringed Hi-Lo's trade dress.', In
considering whether Kramer possessed a valid copyright in the Hi-Lo audi-
ovisual, the Fourth Circuit first addressed the copyrightability of audiovis-
ualsA2 After determining that audiovisuals constituted copyrightable subject
matter under the 1976 Act, the Fourth Circuit questioned whether video
game audiovisuals were copyrightable under the statutory definition of
audiovisual works.5 3 The Fourth Circuit determined that the 1976 Act
requires that video game audiovisuals meet the requirements of fixation and
originality to qualify for copyright protection.5 4 Focusing first on the orig-
inality requirement, the Fourth Circuit required only a minimal degree of
originality before a work could receive copyright protection.5 The Fourth
Circuit determined, however, that Hi-Lo was a derivative work of previous
Draw Poker video games because Hi-Lo had evolved from changes made
in those video games." The Fourth Circuit found that because Kramer
publicly had released the previous versions of Hi-Lo, only the new material
that Kramer added to create Hi-Lo constituted original material.17 The
51. Id. at 432. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit in Kramer, Kramer abandoned its claims
that Andrews had competed uffairly in violation of the common law and that Andrews had
breached a distributorship agreement with Kramer. Id. at 425 n.i.
52. Id. at 432-43.
53. Id. at 435-36; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "audiovisual works"); supra note
8 (defining "audiovisual works").
54. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 433; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982) (requiring fixation and
originality to establish valid audiovisual copyright); supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text
(discussing 1976 Act's requirements of originality and fixation).
55. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 438. The Fourth Circuit in Kramer reasoned that demanding
more than a minimal degree of originality to establish the copyrightability of a work would
require a court to assume the function of artistic critics. Id.
56. Id. at 437-38. In Kramer, the Fourth Circuit relied on the district court's finding
that Hi-Lo constituted a derivative work. Id. at 437. The Kramer court defined a derivative
work under the 1976 Act as a work that results from transforming or adapting a pre-existing,
copyrightable work. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "derivative work"). In discussing
the copyrightability of a derivative work, the Kramer court required that a derivative work
meet the originality requirement of the 1976 Act. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 437; see 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (1982) (requiring originality in all copyrightable works). The court found that because
Hi-Lo was a derivative work, only the new material that Kramer had added to the underlying
audiovisual work to create the Hi-Lo audiovisual constituted original material. Kramer, 783
F.2d at 437; see M. NIaR, supra note 20, § 3.04, at 3-15 (copyright in derivative work
protects against copying of that work's original material). The Kramer court also discussed
the copyrightability of a compilation and concluded that the particular combination and
arrangement of previously copyrighted works could constitute the original material in a work.
Kramer, 783 F.2d at 438-40. The Fourth Circuit, however, did not conclude expressly that
Kramer's work constituted a compilation of previous works. See id. at 440 (determining that
pictures' arrangement in Kramer's audiovisual is copyrightable).
57. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 437; see supra note 56 (discussing Kramer court's finding that
originality exists in derivative works).
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Kramer court determined that under the court's low standard of originality,
the new material in Hi-Lo satisfied the 1976 Act's originality requirement."
Regarding fixation, the Fourth Circuit determined that a work satisfied the
1976 Act's fixation requirement if a tangible object embodied the work."
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because a video game's memory device,
or computer program, allowed a person to view video game audiovisuals,
the video game's memory device, or computer program, permanently em-
bodied the audiovisual. 0 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the
Hi-Lo audiovisual also satisfied the fixation requirement of the 1976 Act. 6'
In addition to finding that the Hi-Lo audiovisual satisfied the fixation
and originality requirements of the 1976 Act, the Fourth Circuit required
that the Hi-Lo audiovisual embody an expression of an idea, rather than
an actual idea, to receive copyright protection. 62 The Kramer court empha-
sized that an audiovisual embodied an expression of an idea if a person
could express the idea of the work in numerous ways. 6 By finding that
numerous programs conceivably could recreate the Hi-Lo audiovisual dis-
play, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Hi-Lo audiovisual display con-
stituted an expression of an idea. 64 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, upheld
the validity of the Hi-Lo audiovisual copyright. 6
After determining the validity of Kramer's copyright on the Hi-Lo
audiovisual, the Fourth Circuit considered the scope of the protection that
Hi-Lo's audiovisual copyright afforded Kramer.66 The Kramer court rea-
58. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 439. In Kramer the Fourth Circuit failed to resolve Kramer's
argument that the court should consider Kramer's rights in Draw Poker II, which was the
original audiovisual work from which Kramer derived the Hi-Lo audiovisual, when determining
the scope of originality in Hi-Lo. Id. at 437 n.17.
59. Id. at 441.
60. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Kramer found that a person could not view video game
audiovisuals until electric impulses travelled through the video game's memory device, or
computer program. Id. As a result, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the video game's memory
device, or computer program, constituted the tangible medium of expression embodying an
audiovisual under the 1976 Act. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring fixation in
tangible medium of expression for work to receive copyright protection).
61. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442-43.
62. Id. at 435; supra note 1 (discussing 1976 Act's requirement that copyright protects
expression of idea rather than idea).
63. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 436. The Kramer court relied on Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp. to distinguish between an idea and an expression of an idea. Id.;
see Apple, 714 F.2d at 1253 (establishing test for distinguishing between idea and expression).
The Apple court determined that if only one way existed to express an idea, the expression
of the idea merged with the idea to provide an author with no copyrightable material. Apple,
714 F.2d at 1253. The Apple court also found, however, that when numerous ways existed to
express an idea, a court could separate idea from expression to provide an author with
copyrightable material. Id.; see infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing facts and
reasoning of Apple decision).
64. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 436; see supra note 63 (discussing test to distinguish idea from
expression of idea).
65. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 436.
66. Id. at 441-43.
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soned that because the video game met the fixation requirement of the 1976
Act, a copyright could protect the video game audiovisual. 67 Using the terms
"memory device" and "computer program" interchangeably, the Fourth
Circuit found that the Hi-Lo audiovisual display met the fixation require-
ment because the video game's memory device, or computer program,
embodied the Hi-Lo audiovisual.68 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because
the computer program embodied the audiovisual for fixation purposes, 69
the computer program satisfied the statutory definition of a "copy" of the
Hi-Lo audiovisual under the 1976 Act.70 The Kramer court found that
copyrights protected both the original work and copies of that work.7' The
Fourth Circuit concluded that because the computer program underlying
the Hi-Lo audiovisual embodied the audiovisual, the protection that the
video game audiovisual copyright afforded the audiovisual copyright holder
extended to the audiovisual display and to the underlying computer program
embodying the expression of that display.72
After finding that the copyright on the audiovisual display protected the
video game audiovisual display and the computer program to the extent
that the computer program embodied the expression of the audiovisual, the
Fourth Circuit considered whether Kramer had forfeited Kramer's copyright
by falling to affix proper copyright notice on Hi-Lo . 7 The Kramer court
67. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing Kramer court's finding that
video game audiovisuals are copyrightable because ROM or computer program embodied
audiovisual); see also supra note 16 (discussing fixation requirement of 1976 Act).
68. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441; see supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing video
game audiovisual's embodiment in memory device); infra note 69 (same).
69. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441. The Kramer court determined that the memory device or
computer program embodies the video game audiovisual. Id.; see supra text accompanying
note 68 (disclosing Kramer court's interchangeable use of terms "memory device" and
"computer program"). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the memory device or computer
program acted as an essential element of the video game audiovisual. Kramer, 783 F.2d at
441.
70. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441-42; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "copy").
71. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442. The Kramer court determined that the 1976 Act grants a
copyright holder the exclusive right to reproduce copies of a copyrighted work. Id.; see 17
U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982) (giving copyright holder protection for copies of copyrighted work).
72. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442. The Kramer court reasoned that because the memory
device or computer program constituted an essential element of the video game audiovisual,
the audiovisual copyright should protect the underlying computer program from infringement.
Id. The Fourth Circuit cited Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman in finding that the video game
audiovisual copyright protected the underlying computer program. Id. at 441; see Stern, 669
F.2d at 856 (finding audiovisual's fixation in computer). The Kramer court cited the Stern
court as defining "video games" as computers that a person had programmed to create images
on a screen. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 435 n.13; Stern, 669 F.2d at 853 (defining "video games").
As a result, the Fourth Circuit determined that video game audiovisuals are computer programs.
Kramer, 783 F.2d at 435 n.12; see Stern, 669 F.2d at 855 (defining "video game audiovisual
works"). See generally infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing facts and reasoning
of Stern).
73. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 443-44; see 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982) (requiring affixation of
copyright notice).
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determined that although Kramer originally had failed to affix proper
copyright notice to Hi-Lo games, Kramer could have rectified the omission
under the 1976 Act by making a reasonable effort to add notice to Hi-Lo
games upon discovering the omission.7 4 The Fourth Circuit found that
Kramer had made reasonable efforts to rectify the initial mistaken omission
because upon discovering the omission, Kramer tried to affix proper co-
pyright notice to the Hi-Lo games that Kramer had not distributed to the
public.7 The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that Kramer had not
forfeited the validity of the Hi-Lo audiovisual copyright.
7 6
After concluding that Kramer had not forfeited Kramer's copyright on
the Hi-Lo audiovisual, the Fourth Circuit considered Kramer's claim that
Andrews had infringed Kramer's copyright in the audiovisual display.7 7 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that because an audiovisual copyright protects an
underlying computer program, proof of audiovisual infringement can result
from a finding that a defendant copied either the computer program or the
audiovisual display.7 The Fourth Circuit concluded that because Andrews
admitted to copying the underlying computer program, Andrews had infr-
inged the copyright on Kramer's Hi-Lo audiovisual.7 9
After determining that Andrews had infringed Kramer's copyright on
the Hi-Lo audiovisual, the Fourth Circuit considered whether Andrews'
infringement was innocent under the 1976 Act.80 The Fourth Circuit found
that under the 1976 Act, a copyright infringer can escape liability for
74. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 443-44; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (establishing methods to
excuse omission of copyright notice). The Fourth Circuit in Kramer relied on the 1976 Act to
find that courts will excuse the initial omission of proper copyright notice in at least two
situations. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 443. The Kramer court determined that courts will excuse the
initial omission of proper copyright notice if the author has distributed only a few copies of
the work to the public, or if the author registered the work with the Copyright Office within
five years of the work's first distribution and made a reasonable effort after discovering the
omission to affix proper copyright notice to publicly distributed copies of the work. Kramer,
783 F.2d at 443; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (establishing methods to excuse omission of
copyright notice).
75. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 444.
76. Id.; see 2 M. NI&MER, supra note 20, § 7.13[B][2], at 7-93 (discussing reasonableness
of author's effort to rectify omission of copyright notice).
77. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 444-46.
78. Id. at 444-45.
79. Id. at 445. In Kramer the Fourth Circuit determined that because direct proof of
copying existed, Kramer did not have to prove that a substantial similarity existed between
Kramer's and Andrews' Hi-Lo audiovisual displays. Id. at 445-46. The Kramer court determined
that when direct evidence of copying did not exist, a plaintiff could prove copyright infringement
by showing that a defendant had access to the original audiovisual and that a substantial
similarity existed between two video game audiovisuals. Id. at 445; see 3 M. NIm sR, supra
note 20, § 13.01[B], at 13-6 (access and substantial similarity prove copyright infringement).
The Fourth Circuit found that although substantial similarity could suffice to prove copyright
infringement when no direct evidence of copying existed, direct evidence of copying satisfied
the proof requirement for copyright infringement. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445.
80. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 446-47; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982) (listing valid excuses for
copyright infringement).
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infringement if the infringer, because of an omission of copyright notice,
innocently believed that no copyright protection existed for the work.8 The
Fourth Circuit determined, however, that the innocent infringer must prove
reliance on the omission of notice.82 The Kramer court concluded that
because Andrews had reason to believe that Kramer held a valid interest in
Hi-Lo when Andrews copied Hi-Lo, Andrews' infringement was not inno-
cent.83
After concluding that Andrews had infringed Kramer's audiovisual co-
pyright, the Fourth Circuit addressed Kramer's claim that Andrews had
infringed the trade dress4 of the Hi-Lo game. 85 The Kramer court determined
that Andrews could infringe Kramer's trade dress in Hi-Lo only if Hi-Lo
had acquired a secondary meaning. 6 The Fourth Circuit found, however,
that if evidence of deliberate copying existed, courts could assume that
secondary meaning existed because of the infringer's deliberate act of
copying. 7 The Fourth Circuit concluded that because Andrews deliberately
copied Hi-Lo's console, infringement of Hi-Lo's trade dress existed without
proof of secondary meaning.88
The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that images in video games meet
the statutory definition of "audiovisual works." 8 9 The Fourth Circuit,
81. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 447; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982) (discussing "innocent
infringer").
82. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 447.
83. Id. at 446-47. In Kramer the Fourth Circuit determined that a defendant cannot
escape liability for infringing a copyright unless the defendant proves that infringement was
innocent. Id.
84. See id. at 448 n.25. In Kramer the Fourth Circuit found that trade dress concerns
the total image of a person's product, packaging, and advertising. Id. The Fourth Circuit
determined that the trade dress of Hi-Lo included the design of Hi-Lo's console, the artwork
on Hi-Lo's glass frontpiece, and the Hi-Lo name. Id.
85. Id. at 447-50.
86. Id. at 448. The Fourth Circuit in Kramer determined that the term "secondary
meaning" meant that the consuming public first must associate the infringed product with a
particular producer, and then must associate the product's trade dress with the product. Id at
449. The Fourth Circuit found that secondary meaning existed only when the public associated
a particular feature of a product with the product's producer. Id. The Kramer court determined
that to establish infringement of a work's trade dress, a plaintiff must establish not only that
a secondary meaning had attached to the work's trade dress, but also that a likelihood of
confusion resulted from copying the work's trade dress. Id. at 448-49. The Kramer court,
however, failed to decide whether a likelihood of confusion resulted from Andrews' copying
the Hi-Lo trade dress because the district court had not addressed the issue. See id. at 448
n.24 (refusing to decide likelihood of confusion issue in Kramer).
87. Id. at 449-50. In Kramer the Fourth Circuit maintained that although evidence of
intentional, direct copying established a presumption that secondary meaning existed, a trade
dress infringer could rebut the presumption. Id. at 448.
88. Id. See generally 2 J. McCA.R=, TDn~A Ks AND U-F.I CoTrrxo¢N §§ 27.1-
27.9 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing rules and case law regarding trade dress issue); Note, The
Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 77, 77-85 (1982) (discussing trade dress infringement).
89. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 436; see supra note 8 (defining "audiovisual work"); supra
note 10 and accompanying text (describing courts' reasoning in finding that video game
audiovisuals meet statutory definition of audiovisual work under 1976 Act).
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therefore, properly concluded that the audiovisual of Hi-Lo qualified for
copyright protection." The Fourth Circuit's decision upholding the copy-
rightability of the Hi-Lo audiovisual is consistent with numerous decisions
90. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 443; see supra notes 10, 20, 21 and accompanying text (discussing
copyrightability of video game audiovisuals). In determining that the Hi-Lo audiovisual
qualified for copyright protection, the Kramer court recognized that video game audiovisuals
can meet the copyright standard for originality. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 473; see Bandai-America,
546 F. Supp. at 139 (copyright certificate provides evidence of originality of video game
audiovisuals). In discussing Hi-Lo's originality, the Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's
Hi-Lo game constituted a derivative work because the game evolved from changes that Kramer
had made in Kramer's Draw Poker II game. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 437; see supra notes 37, 56
(discussing Kramer's facts and reasoning regarding derivative works). A "derivative work"
evolves from a process of adapting or transforming one or more pre-existing works. 1976
HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 57. A copyright in a derivative work protects against copying
an author's original contribution to the original work. I M. NnaAMER, supra note 20, § 3.04,
at 3-15.
In discussing originality in derivative works, the Fourth Circuit cited a case from the
Fifth Circuit to show that the copyright on a derivative work covers more than the new
contribution. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 440; see Apple Barrel Prod., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384,
387-88 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing originality in compilation works). In Apple Barrel, however,
the Fifth Circuit discussed only copyrights protecting compilation works, not derivative works.
See Apple Barrel Prod., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 384 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing copyright
protection of compilations). Although the Fifth Circuit in Apple Barrel only discussed copy-
rights protecting compilation works, the Kramer court's failure to distinguish between com-
pilation and derivative works appears unimportant. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 440 (discussing
arrangement of audiovisuals); Apple Barrel, 730 F.2d at 387-88 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing
copyright protection of compilations). Although in passing the 1976 Act Congress determined
that compilation and derivative works represented different concepts, the originality standards
in a compilation work that contains pre-existing materials, a collective work, and in a derivative
work generally do not receive different substantive treatment. See 1 M. N~MR, supra note
20, § 3.02, at 3-8 (discussing similarity of originality standards between derivative works and
collective works); see also 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 57 (stating that compilation
and derivative works represent different concepts).
Although the Kramer court continuously refers to the Hi-Lo audiovisual as a derivative
work, the Fourth Circuit determined that copyright protection extended to the arrangement of
designs in the Hi-Lo audiovisual, which suggests that the Fourth Circuit may have protected
part of the Hi-Lo audiovisual as a compilation or collective work. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at
439 (providing copyright protection to arrangement of Hi-Lo audiovisual). Copyright protection
of compilations and collective works attaches to the arrangement of previously existing materials
in the compilation. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 20, § 3.04, at 3-16. The copyright on the
derivative work, however, protects only the new material that an author adds to a copyrightable,
pre-existing work. Id. The precise differentiations between derivative and collective works
remain unclear, however, because few courts or commentators have attempted to make exact
distinctions between the two types of works. See Mister B Textiles Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics,
Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing that no precedent exists to guide courts
in distinguishing between derivative and collective works); 1 M. NnafR, supra note 20, §
3.02, at 3-8 (recognizing resemblance of derivative work to collective work).
Although the distinction between derivative and compilation works remains vague, the
protection of a portion of Hi-Lo as a compilation in Kramer appears accurate because the
Copyright Office registered Hi-Lo as a compilation. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428 (discussing
Kramer's copyright registration of Hi-Lo audiovisual). The Fourth Circuit, however, failed to
recognize the distinction between a compilation and derivative work. See id. at 439.
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in other circuits validating the copyrightability of video games.9' The Fourth
Circuit also correctly recognized that the temporary omission of proper
copyright notice from Hi-Lo did not defeat the validity of the Hi-Lo
audiovisual copyright. 92 Other circuits agree that a copyright holder need
exert only a reasonable effort to affix notice to all copies of a work that
an author has not distributed to the public at the time of the discovery of
the omission of the copyright notice. 93 The Fourth Circuit's extension of
the protection that the audiovisual copyright affords the computer program,
however, substantially departs from decisions of other circuits.9 4
91. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (listing decisions that uphold copyrightability
of video game audiovisuals); see also WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video,
Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1982) (giving historical background behind expansive
interpretation of term "audiovisual work").
92. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 444; see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing
Kramer court's decision regarding forfeiture of copyright protection because of notice omissions
from Hi-Lo audiovisuals). The 1976 Act requires that notice of copyright appear on all
copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982). The 1976 Act establishes a specific form of
copyright notice that authors must attach to the authors' works to retain valid copyright
protection over a work. See id. § 401(b) (form of notice must include specific symbol, year
of first publication, and name of copyright owner). In Kramer Kramer initially sold Hi-Lo
games without the proper form of notice. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428. The Kramer court properly
recognized, however, that the 1976 Act allows an author to cure the initial omission of
copyright notice by making reasonable efforts to affix proper notice to the copyrighted work
after discovering the copyright notice's omission. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (allowing
author to cure initial omission of copyright notice). The Kramer court concluded that Kramer
had not forfeited the validity of the copyright on Hi-Lo's audiovisual because Kramer had
made reasonable efforts to affix proper notice to games that Kramer had not yet distributed
to the public. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428; see 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (allowing author to
cure initial omission of copyright notice).
93. See, e.g., Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assocs., 764 F.2d 69, 72
(2d Cir. 1985) (author meets standard for reasonable effort when author affixes notice to
undistributed works); Hagendorf v. Brown, 699 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (unintentional
omission of notice does not affect copyright); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy
Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 1982) (copyright holder must make reasonable effort
to affix proper notice to undistributed games after discovering omission). Determining whether
the copyright holder made a reasonable effort to affix proper notice is a question of fact. See
Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assocs., 764 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (court
must view as issue of fact reasonableness of copyright holder's efforts). If the discovery of
the copyright notice's omission does not occur within five years of the work's original
publication, however, the copyright automatically becomes invalid. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2)
(1982) (no forfeiture of copyright if discovery of omission made within five years after work's
publication). Because the original author had published Draw Poker I, the original version of
Hi-Lo, less than five years before Kramer discovered Hi-Lo's faulty copyright notice, the
Kramer court correctly found that Kramer did not forfeit the Hi-Lo audiovisual copyright.
See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428.
94. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (describing Kramer court's extension of audiovisual
copyright protection); infra notes 111-47 and accompanying text (discussing scope of video
game audiovisual copyright protection). Compare Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (audiovisual
copyright protects underlying computer program of video game) with Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Artie Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (audiovisual copyright protects design,
movement, and sounds of characters), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
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In justifying its position that the video game audiovisual copyright
protected the underlying computer program, the Fourth Circuit held that
both the video game computer program and the memory device acted as
"copies" of the audiovisual. 95 Like the Fourth Circuit in Kramer, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Stern Electronics, Inc.
v. Kaufman96 concluded that the memory device of a video game satisfies
the statutory definition of a "copy" of the video game audiovisual for the
purpose of establishing the audiovisual's fixation. 97 In Stern the Second
Circuit considered whether the audiovisual of the "Scramble" video game
was eligible for copyright protection." The Second Circuit recognized that
an author of a video game audiovisual must establish that the audiovisual
constitutes a fixed element in a tangible object to register a copyright in
the audiovisual. 99 The Stern court found that under the 1976 Act an
audiovisual can constitute a fixed element when a person can perceive or
reproduce the audiovisual from an object with the aid of a machine. 1 The
Second Circuit reasoned that because a person can reproduce a video game
audiovisual from the game's memory device, the memory device meets the
statutory definition of a "copy" of the audiovisual. 0 1 Unlike the Fourth
Circuit, however, the Stern court stopped short of finding that the computer
program underlying a video game audiovisual constituted a copy of the
video game audiovisual.'0 2
823 (1983). But see Atari, 672 F.2d at 615 (failing to determine extent of protection of
repetitive sequence of portion of sights and sounds of video games after finding sequence of
portion copyrighted).
95. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442.
96. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
97. Stern, 669 F.2d at 856; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "copies"); supra notes
16, 19, 20 and accompanying text (discussing 1976 Act's requirement of fixation for video
game audiovisuals).
98. Stern, 669 F.2d at 853-54. In Stern Stem Electronics, Inc. (Stem), an amusement
equipment manufacturer, had procured an exclusive sub-license from a Japanese company to
distribute the "Scramble" video game in the United States. Id. at 854. The defendant Omni
Video Games, Inc. (Omni) began selling a copy of the "Scramble" video game simultaneously
with Stem. Id. Omni had created the copy of Stem's "Scramble" game by writing a new
computer program that replicated the "Scramble" audiovisual display. Id. at 854-55. Addi-
tionally, the Omni video game bore the same name as Stem's game. Id. at 854. Omni sold
its copy of the "Scramble" video game for several hundred dollars less than Stem's game.
Id. at 855.
99. Id. at 855 (only works fixed in tangible objects are copyrightable); see supra note
16 (discussing 1976 Act's fixation requirement).
100. Stern, 669 F.2d at 856; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (requiring fixation in tangible
object); supra note 16 (discussing 1976 Act's fixation requirement).
101. See Stern, 669 F.2d at 855 (memory devices of game satisfy statutory requirement
of "copy" for fixation purposes); supra note 16 (defining "copy").
102. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (audiovisual copyright protects computer program);
Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-56 (only memory device constitutes video game audiovisual's copy); see
supra note 68-70 (discussing Kramer court's reasoning in finding that computer program
constitutes copy of audiovisual).
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Although the Kramer court interchangeably used the terms "memory
device" and "program,"'' 0 decisions in other circuits suggest that the
memory device and the program do not constitute the same item. For
example, in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.104 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit quoted Stern'05 in
finding that the memory device of the "Defender" video game constituted
a copy of the video game audiovisual.'06 After finding video game audio-
visuals copyrightable, however, the Williams court considered the relation-
ship between the video game's memory device and the computer program.
0 7
In Williams Williams Electronics, Inc. (Williams) claimed that Artic Inter-
national, Inc. (Artic) had infringed Williams' separate audiovisual and
computer program copyrights by selling copies of Williams' "Defender"
video game. 08 The Third Circuit distinguished the video game's memory
device from the computer program by determining that the memory device
acts as a utilitarian mechanism to "store" the computer program in the
memory device circuitry. 09 The Third Circuit concluded, therefore, that the
computer program and memory device did not constitute the same feature.' 10
103. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441-42 (using terms "memory device" and "computer
program" interchangeably).
104. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
105. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing
Stern).
106. Williams, 685 F.2d at 874. In Williams Williams Electronics, Inc. (Williams) had
registered two copyrights on two different audiovisual displays in the electronic video game
"Defender," and one copyright on the game's computer program. Id. at 872. The defendant,
Artic International, Inc. (Artic), sold a video game called "Defense Command." Id. The
district court in Williams had determined that the audiovisual displays in "Defense Command"
and the text of the video game's computer program were virtually identical to the audiovisuals
and computer program of Williams' game. See id. at 872-73 (discussing district court's findings).
On appeal the Third Circuit in Williams considered the validity and scope of the copyright
protection that Williams' copyrights provided. Id, at 873.
107. Id. at 876-77.
108. Id. at 873.
109. Id. at 876 (information that ROM contains is subject of copyright); see Strohon,
564 F. Supp. at 752 (program copyright protects information in ROM); supra note 20 (defining
ROM).
110. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 876 (finding that ROM contains program); see also Apple,
714 F.2d at 1249 (distinguishing computer program from ROM). In Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp. the Third Circuit again considered the relationship between a video
game's memory device and underlying computer program. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249. In Apple
Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) claimed infringement of a computer program copyright that
Apple held. Id. at 1244-45. The defendant in Apple had copied Apple's program after Apple
had translated the program into a machine-readable object code and had embedded the object
code into a ROM. Id. at 1243; see supra note 2 (defining and discussing object code), The
Apple court distinguished the ROM, which stores the object code's information, from the
object code, which is a copy of the original human-readable computer program. Apple, 714
F.2d at 1249. The Third Circuit determined that the "copy" of the original computer program
was not the actual memory device, but the information that the programmer had embedded
in the memory device. Id. at 1249 n.7. The Apple court determined that the information that
the programmer embedded into a memory device was the machine-readable object code. Id.;
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In addition to finding a distinction between the memory device and
computer program, the Third Circuit in Williams considered the scope of
protection that separate copyrights in a video game audiovisual and com-
puter program afford a holder of those audiovisual and program copy-
rights.' The Williams court separated the protection that the audiovisual
and program copyrights afford copyright holders"2 and recognized that the
memory device acts as a copy of the audiovisual."' The Williams court,
however, did not extend copyright protection from the audiovisual copyright
to the information inside the memory device.114 The Third Circuit found
that copyrights on the computer program, rather than audiovisual copy-
rights, should protect the information in the memory device."' The Williams
court reasoned that in video games, manufacturers loaded the computer
programs into the memory device to control the video game machine's
activities." 6 The Third Circuit held that because the computer program loads
directly into the memory device, copying the information in the memory
device would infringe the computer program copyright.
1 7
Although the Third Circuit found that the memory device contained the
computer program, the Williams court did not find that the computer
program embodied the video game audiovisual."" The Third Circuit deter-
mined that the circuitry of the memory device embodied the video game
audiovisual for fixation purposes, but not that the information in the
memory device's circuitry embodied the audiovisual."19 The Williams court
found, however, that the mechanical nature of the video game's memory
device precluded the memory device from receiving copyright protection.
20
see supra note 2 (discussing machine-readable object code). The Third Circuit reasoned that
because the object code was a translation of the original source code program, the object code
was a computer program. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1248-49; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (providing
copyright holder with exclusive rights over translations of copyrighted work); 17 U.S.C. § 101
(Supp. III 1985) (defining computer program as instructions that computer uses either directly
or indirectly). The Third Circuit concluded, therefore, that the computer program copyright
protected the object code, or the information which the programmer had embedded in the
ROM. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249.
111. Williams, 685 F.2d at 874-78; see supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing
facts of Williams).
112. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874-78 (discussing separate protection of audiovisual and
computer program copyrights).
113. See id. at 874 (recognizing that memory devices satisfy statutory definition of
audiovisual's copy); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (1976 Act's definition of "copy").
114. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874-75 (limiting audiovisual copyright protection to video
game's audiovisual aspects).
115. Id. at 876-77.
116. Id. at 877.
117. See id. (copying object code that is embedded in ROM constitutes infringement of
computer program copyright).
118. See id. at 874-75; supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing Williams
court's separation of ROM and computer program).
119. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874 (memory device embodies video game audiovisual).
120. Id. at 874-75.
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As a result, the Third Circuit in Williams limited the protection that the
video game audiovisual copyrights provide copyright holders to the audio-
visual aspects of the video game appearing on the video screen.' 2' The Third
Circuit indicated, therefore, that the audiovisual copyright protection did
not extend to the underlying computer program. 122
In addition to the Third Circuit in Williams, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has considered the scope of protection that
a video game audiovisual copyright affords a copyright holder.'2 In Atari,
Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.124 the defendant
had used Atari, Inc.'s (Atari) Pac-Man video game audiovisual as a basis
for developing a home video game.'21 The alleged infringer in Atari had
altered the shape of the audiovisual's maze and characters before selling
the alleged copy of the Pac-Man game. 126 The Seventh Circuit did not
compare the underlying computer programs in determining whether the
defendant had infringed Atari's audiovisual copyright. 27 Rather, the Atari
court maintained that copyright infringement depended on whether the
alleged copy captured the "total concept and feel" of the copyrighted
work. 12 In applying the "total concept and feel" test, the Seventh Circuit
compared the visual appearance and design of Atari's and the defendant's
video game audiovisuals. 129 Although the Seventh Circuit held that the
121. Id.
122 Id.
123. See Atari, 672 F.2d at.612-13 (considering protection of video game audiovisual
copyright).
124. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
125. Id. at 613. In Atari an independent contractor created a video game called "K.C.
Munchkin" as a home video game for North American Philips Consumer Electronics Cor-
poration (Philips) for use in Philips' "Odyssey" line of home video games. Id. K.C. Munchkin
resembled the Pac-Man video game in which plaintiffs Atari, Inc. (Atari) and Midway
Manufacturing Company (Midway) owned audiovisual copyrights. Id. at 610, 613. Although
Philips sought a license under Midway's Pac-Man copyright to use the Pac-Man name on
Philips' games, Philips marketed its game under the K.C. Munchkin name after Midway
refused to give Philips a license. Id. at 613. The independent contractor who developed the
K.C. Munchkin game for Philips created the K.C. Munchkin video game after playing the
Pac-Man video game. Id.
126. Id. at 613. The Third Circuit in Atari noted a number of differences between the
K.C. Munchkin and Pac-Man audiovisual displays. See id. at 612-13. Additionally, the Atari
court maintained that the K.C. Munchkin game had a distinctive set of sounds that differed
from the sounds of Pac-Man. Id. at 613.
127. See id. at 614-15, 619-20 (comparing only visual aspects of video audiovisuals in
considering infringement of audiovisual copyright).
128. Id. at 614. In examining the "total concept and feel" of the two audiovisual displays,
the Atari court applied the "ordinary observer" test. Id. The "ordinary observer" test considers
whether an ordinary, reasonable person would find that because the similarities between two
works were so great, a copier must have appropriated improperly the original work. Id. The
court maintained that the "ordinary observer" test does not involve analytical dissection, but
merely depends on whether an ordinary, reasonable person would find that the "total concept
and feel" of the original work exists in the copied work. Id.
129. See id. at 619 (comparing audiovisuals' appearance and design); see supra note 128
(discussing Atari court's application of "total concept and feel" theory).
[Vol. 44:505
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
defendant had infringed Atari's audiovisual copyright, the Atari court relied
solely on the visual pattern and design of the video screens in ruling on the
audiovisual copyright infringement issue. 130 The Atari case, therefore, ap-
pears to illustrate the proposition that audiovisual copyrights protect only
the visual aspects of the video game and not the computer program that
the memory device stores.'
Although the Third and Seventh Circuits determined that protection
from a video game audiovisual copyright does not extend to the underlying
computer program, courts have found difficulty in justifying the grounds
for limiting the protection of an audiovisual copyright to the audiovisual.
132
For example, the Second Circuit in Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman
3
considered whether a video game audiovisual could sustain a copyright
separately from the video game's underlying computer program. 34 The
Second Circuit in Stern found that both the audiovisual and the computer
program have completely separable features. 35 The Stern court compared
the video game, which consists of an audiovisual and written program, to
an audio tape, which embodies both a musical composition and a sound
recording within one component. 36 The Stern court observed that although
both the composition and the sound recording exist within one component,
the musical composition can receive a separate copyright. 37 The Stern court
determined that like the embodiment of a sound recording and musical
composition in the same component, the embodiment of both the audiovisual
and the computer program in the same components of a video game did
not defeat the separability of the audiovisual and computer program co-
pyrights.'
Although the Stern court emphasized the separable features of an audi-
ovisual and computer program, the Second Circuit failed to recognize that
each new sound recording of a musical composition reflects a new expression
130. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 615, 619 (comparing visual patterns and designs to determine
if copyright infringement existed).
131. See id. at 619 (relying solely on visual pattern and design of video screens in
considering audiovisual copyright infringement).
132. See id. at 615 (recognizing lack of absolute boundaries between separate audiovisual
and computer program copyrights); Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749 (failing to establish absolute
boundaries between audiovisual and program copyrights); supra notes 109-31 and accompanying
text (discussing Third and Seventh Circuit decisions regarding scope of audiovisual copyright
protection); infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing Stern).
133. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
134. Id. at 856.
135. See id. at 856-57 (maintaining that audiovisual and program have separable features,
but declining to decide how to separate).
136. Id. at 856.
137. Id.; see I M. NnBOMeR, supra note 20, § 2.10[A], at 2-140 (sound recording may
receive separate copyright).
138. See Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (visual and aural features of audiovisual copyrightable
even though underlying written computer program separately copyrightable).
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of that composition." 9 New actors, singers, and producers add distinctive
contributions to a musical composition, making the originality of that new
work separately copyrightable with each new sound recording. 40 In video
games, however, computer instructions create the same audiovisual display
each time the memory device utilizes the instructions.141 Consequently, once
a programmer embeds a set of computer instructions into a video game
memory device, the programmer permanently restricts the creation of any
new development of the expression of the video game's idea.1 42 The Stern
analogy between video games and sound recordings, therefore, illustrates
the difficulty in rationalizing the need for separate copyrights in a video
game audiovisual and underlying computer program. 43 Although most courts
have separated the copyright protection of the video game audiovisual from
the copyright protection of the computer program,' 44 the rationale for
requiring separate copyrights appears weak. Rationalizing the need for
separate copyrights on the video game audiovisual and underlying computer
program becomes even more difficult after realizing that the audiovisual
and computer program are related integrally.' 4- Because the audiovisual
cannot exist without the computer program, the program is integral to the
audiovisual's existence. 46 The idea that Kramer establishes of protecting
139. See id. (comparing video game audiovisual to sound recording); Note, Defining the
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REv. 497, 532-33 (1986)
(each sound recording expresses sheet music differently because performers and conductor
make additional contributions to expression of sheet music).
140. See Note, supra note 139, at 533 (each new sound recording is distinctive expression
of musical composition).
141. See id. at 532-33 (no additional authorship necessary in video game once programmer
writes computer instructions to produce specific screen displays).
142. Id.
143. See Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (analogizing video games and sound recordings); Note,
supra note 139, at 532-33 (discussing differences between originality in sound compositions
and audiovisual works).
144. See Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (underlying program exists independently and is capable
of separate copyright); Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749 (considering independent and interrelated
aspects of audiovisual and program).
145. See infra note 146 (discussing integral relationship between video game audiovisual
and underlying computer program).
146. See Note, supra note 139, at 532 (finding audiovisual display and computer program
integrally related). A musical composition is an example of a single copyrightable work that
embodies separately copyrightable works that an author has integrated together. Id. Courts
have found that because of the integral nature of the relationship of music and lyrics in a
musical composition, an author of a musical composition integrates the separately copyrightable
works into a single work. See Standard Music Roll Co. v. F. A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360, 362
(3d Cir. 1917) (under 1909 Act, words and music combine to become integral parts of musical
composition); Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(song's lyrics and music constitute "musical composition" because both music and words
merged into single work). Similarly, the component parts of a video game act together as an
integral work. See Note, supra note 139, at 532 (1986) (courts should treat computer instructions
and associated screen displays as integral unit because instructions and screen displays are sold
together and difficult to separate); see also Stern, 669 F.2d at 853 (video games need computer
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both the audiovisual and the computer program with a single copyright
appears to dispose of the problem of separating the copyright protection of
the video game audiovisual from the underlying computer program.
147
Although the Kramer court's extension of copyright protection from the
audiovisual to the underlying computer program disposes of the need to
rationalize the separate protection that individual copyrights in an audio-
visual and a computer program afford copyright holders, the Kramer court's
extension of audiovisual copyright protection to the computer program
differs with the current practices of the Copyright Office and permits dual
protection of the video game computer program. 48 The 1976 Act, in
conjunction with the 1980 Amendment, provides for the separate copyright-
program, which creates audiovisual, and audiovisual, which displays characters). Without the
audiovisual, the video game's computer program is useless because the game can attract no
customers. See Note, supra note 4, at 532 (success of video game depends on creativity in
graphics). Without the underlying computer program, the video game audiovisual is nonexistent.
See id. (discussing audiovisual's reliance on computer program). As a result, the program and
audiovisual rely on each other to the extent that the two serve as interrelated, inseparable
parts of the video game.
147. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (extending protection of video game audiovisual
copyright to computer program). Requiring separate copyrights on the video game audiovisual
and underlying computer program may present numerous difficulties. See Note, supra note
139, at 530-31 (describing possible difficulties that separate audiovisual and computer program
copyrights create). For example, an author may not know that the author must copyright
separately the audiovisual from the computer program, or that the computer program copyright
does not protect the audiovisual. See id. (copyright holder, through accident or lack of
knowledge, may fail to copyright individually all component parts of video game).
A number of courts have suggested copyrighting integral works as a unit. See, e.g.,
Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (6th Cir.) (single
copyright protects all parts of work when all parts integrally related), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
843 (1974); Standard Music Roll Co. v. F. A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360, 362 (3d Cir. 1917)
(because words and music act as integral parts of single musical composition, single copyright
protects words, music, and musical composition); Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Co., 357 F.
Supp. 1393, 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (musical work copyright protects all parts of work). An
item becomes an integral part of a work when that item constitutes an essential or necessary
part of the overall work. Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Service Corp., 204 F. Supp.
702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfard Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851,
853-54 (2d Cir. 1967) (copyright on doll protects doll's display package because display package
acts as integral part of product, constituting storage facility for doll); Patterson v. Century
Prod., 93 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir, 1937) (notice on first of eight reels of film is sufficient notice
because all eight reels are integral elements of movie), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938);
Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brecher & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (copyright
notice on detachable item sufficient if detachable item serves as integral part of total work).
A recent Fourth Circuit decision, Koontz v. Jaffarian, introduced the term "unit publication"
to describe the idea of protecting integral works under one copyright. See Koontz v. Jaffarian,
617 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (E.D. Va. 1985) (introducing term "unit publication"), aff'd, 787
F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986). See generally Comment, Unit Publication: The Evolution of a
Doctrine, 44 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 647 (1987).
148. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (extending protection of audiovisual copyright to
computer program); see also infra note 150 (discussing practices of Copyright Office regarding
copyright registration).
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ability of the computer program and audiovisual aspects of video games. 49
The Copyright Office, which registers copyrights, generally requires separate
copyright registration for a video game audiovisual and computer pro-
gram. 50 Although Kramer extended copyright protection from an audiovis-
ual to its underlying computer program, the Fourth Circuit did not require
that authors register the authors' intent to protect both the video game
audiovisual and computer program with one copyright.' 5 ' Consequently, the
Kramer decision conflicts with current practices of the Copyright Office
because the Copyright Office generally requires separate registration of the
two works. 152 Because Kramer protects a computer program with an audi-
149. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (listing audiovisual works and computer programs as works
capable of individual copyright protection); see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
copyrightability of computer programs). Although the 1980 Amendment allows for the separate
copyright protection of computer programs, the 1980 Amendment does not preclude video
game programs from receiving copyrights as part of a unit. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining
computer program as copyrightable subject matter); see Standard Music, 241 F. at 362 (musical
composition copyright extends only to previously uncopyrighted parts of musical composition).
150. Circular R49, Registration for Video Games and Other Machine Readable Audiovisual
Works 2, Copyright Office (Library of Congress, May 1986) (establishing procedures for
registering audiovisual copyright); Circular R61, Copyright Registration for Computer Programs
1, Copyright Office (Library of Congress, Nov. 1983) (establishing procedures for registering
computer program copyrights); see Note, supra note 139, at 532-33 (Copyright Office practices
conflict with unit copyrightability of video game program and audiovisual). But see Circular
R55, Copyright Registration for Multimedia Works 6, Copyright Office (Library of Congress,
Aug. 1986) (allowing unit registration of program and audiovisual in certain instances). The
Copyright Office generally requires that an author separately register a video game audiovisual
and computer program on different forms. See Circular R49, supra, at 2 (establishing
procedures for registering video game audiovisual copyright); Circular R61, supra, at 1
(establishing procedures for registering computer program copyright). The Copyright Office
has indicated that an author possibly could protect both the audiovisual display and computer
program under one copyright if, after careful consideration, the Copyright Office gave its
approval. Telephone interview with Dennis Evert, Copyright Information Specialist, Copyright
Office (Oct. 23, 1986). To receive protection under one copyright registration, however, the
author would have to indicate the author's intent to protect both the audiovisual display and
the computer text under one copyright when filing the form that the Copyright Office requires
for audiovisual registration. Id.; see Circular R55, supra, at 1, 6 (author must register intent
to protect both audiovisual and program with one copyright by expressly stating intent on
audiovisual registration form). Because a copyright registration on the computer program in
Kramer existed before Kramer filed the registration on the Hi-Lo audiovisual, however, the
Copyright Office would not have allowed Kramer to copyright the audiovisual and computer
program as a unit because another party previously had registered the computer program. See
Kramer, 783 F.2d at 428 (discussing registration of computer program copyright by SMS
before Kramer's registration of audiovisual copyright). As a result, the Kramer decision conflicts
with the Copyright Office's practice of not protecting video game audiovisuals and computer
programs as a unit unless the author has indicated clearly at the time of registration the
author's intent to register the two works under one copyright. Telephone interview with Dennis
Evert, Copyright Information Specialist, Copyright Office (Oct. 23, 1986).
151. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (protecting video game audiovisual and computer
program with audiovisual copyright).
152. Id.; see supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing practices of Copyright
Office regarding copyright registration).
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ovisual copyright, but does not preclude the Copyright Office from issuing
a copyright on the same computer program, the Kramer decision allows
dual protection of the video game computer program. 5a Consequently, the
Kramer court creates the possibility that a holder of a video game audiovisual
copyright and a holder of a computer program copyright will claim the
same copyright rights in a computer program.
1 54
The Kramer decision not only fails to resolve the conflict that the Fourth
Circuit established by protecting a computer program with two separate
copyrights, but also creates a potential problem by easing proof requirements
in copyright infringement cases. 5 5 The Fourth Circuit in Kramer found that
a plaintiff could prove copying of a video game audiovisual by establishing
that an infringer had copied either the audiovisual or the underlying com-
puter program. 5 6 Although apparently no circuit court has considered
expressly whether proof of copying a program could prove audiovisual
copying, other circuits appear to disagree with the Fourth Circuit's conten-
tion that proof of copying the computer program proves copying the
audiovisual. 57 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. O'Reilly'58 considered whether a criminal
defendant had infringed an audiovisual copyright by distributing counter-
feited copies of the "Kung Fu Master" video game. 59 In O'Reilly the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested the defendant, O'Reilly, after
an FBI special agent purchased counterfeited copies of the "Kung Fu
Master" game from the defendant.1 Although the defendant had sold the
FBI agent printed circuit boards that contained the video game's underlying
computer program, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider the computer
programs in determining whether O'Reilly had infringed the audiovisual
copyright.' 6' The O'Reilly court recognized that the audiovisual copyright
153. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (audiovisual copyright protects computer program); see
also supra note 150 (discussing procedure for copyright registration). Compare Kramer, 783
F.2d at 442 (protecting computer program with audiovisual copyright even though separate
copyright on computer program exists) with Apple, 714 F.2d at 1248 (upholding validity of
computer program copyright) and Williams, 685 F.2d at 875 (establishing validity of separate
computer program and audiovisual copyrights).
154. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442 (protecting previously registered computer program with
audiovisual copyright); supra notes 37-38 (discussing Kramer facts regarding separate copyright
registrations of Hi-Lo by Kramer and SMS).
155. See infra notes 157-84 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions that require
stricter proof requirements for copyright infringement than Kramer court); infra notes 185-89
and accompanying text (discussing problems with proof requirements for copyright infringement
from Kramer).
156. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445 (copying either audiovisual or underlying computer
program constitutes infringement of audiovisual copyright).
157. See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions limiting
proof of audiovisual copyright infringement to visual aspects of audiovisual).
158. 794 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 614.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 615 (viewing only audiovisual displays to determine if audiovisual copyright
infringement exists).
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protects only the work that appears on the video screen. 162 As a result,
because other copyrights protect against infringement of the computer
program, the Eleventh Circuit compared only the visual characteristics of
the video screen images in determining whether the defendant had infringed
the audiovisual copyright.
163
In addition to the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on the video screen images
in finding copyright infringement, several federal district courts have ad-
dressed the factors to consider in cases alleging infringement of an audio-
visual copyright. 1 For example, in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon1
6
1
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois consid-
ered whether a video game audiovisual and underlying computer program
could maintain separate copyright protection.'6 In Strohon Midway Man-
ufacturing Company (Midway) claimed copyright infringement of audiovis-
ual and program copyrights in Midway's "Pac-Man" video game after the
defendant had copied the ROM of the game. 167 The Strohon court deter-
mined that by making subtle changes in the computer program, an author
substantially can change an audiovisual display. 168 The district court recog-
nized that by writing an entirely new program that would create an identical
audiovisual, a person could infringe the copyright on a video game audio-
visual without infringing the copyright on the underlying computer pro-
gram. 169 The Strohon court reasoned that the converse possibility, that a
person could infringe the program's copyright but not the audiovisual's
copyright, also could occur. 70 The district court found infringement of the
computer program copyright because the copied computer program remained
substantially similar to the original. '7' The Strohon court found, however,
that because the defendant substantially had changed the characters and
design in the audiovisual display, no infringement of the audiovisual co-
pyright existed. 72 The district court concluded, therefore, that a person
162. See id. (viewing audiovisual displays to determine if infringement of audiovisual
copyright occurred).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Bally, 568 F. Supp. at 1281-82 (comparing only screen displays in finding
that no audiovisual copyright infringement occurred); Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 746, 749
(distinguishing between audiovisual and program in proving infringement); Bandai-America,
546 F. Supp. at 144-45 (finding no audiovisual copyright infringement after comparing video
screen similarities); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 481-83 (D. Neb.
1981) (comparing similarities in game board to prove infringement).
165. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
166. Id. at 749.
167. Id. at 743-44.
168. Id. In Strohon the Pac-Man characters on the Pac-Man game audiovisual disappeared
completely in the copied version of Pac-Man. Id. at 747. The figures in the copied game were
block figures. Id. The court found no infringement of the audiovisual copyright without the
distinctive Pac-Man characters. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 749.
171. Id. at 752-53.
172. Id. at 748.
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could infringe the computer program copyright without infringing the audi-
ovisual copyright.
73
Although the Strohon court found that a party could infringe a computer
program copyright without infringing the audiovisual copyright, the Fourth
Circuit in Kramer held that proof of copying the computer program proved
copying of the audiovisual. 174 The Kramer court found that audiovisual
copyright infringement exists when a plaintiff proves that another party
copied the video game's underlying computer program. 75 The Fourth Circuit
did not require that any substantial similarity exist between the original and
allegedly copied audiovisual works. 176 Although Kramer appears to be the
only federal circuit court of appeals to address whether direct evidence of
copying dismisses the requirement of substantial similarity between video
game audiovisuals, other circuit court decisions concerning copyrighted
works suggest that to establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
establish not only that direct copying of an audiovisual display occurred,
but that a substantial similarity existed between the original and copied
audiovisual displays. 77 For example, in Universal Athletic Sales Co. v.
173. Id. at 749.
174. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445 (copying computer program infringes audiovisual
copyright). Like Kramer the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
considered whether copyright infringement automatically exists when a plaintiff has direct
evidence of copying a video game audiovisual. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In Broderbund Software, Inc., v.
Unison World, Inc. the plaintiff, Broderbund Software, Inc. (Broderbund), claimed that the
defendant, Unison World, Inc. (Unison), had infringed Broderbund's copyright on the audi-
ovisual of a computer software printing program because Unison had copied the audiovisual's
appearance. Id. at 1131. In Broderbund one of Unison's employees admitted to copying
Broderbund's audiovisual. Id. at 1135. The court concluded that Broderbund had produced
sufficient direct evidence of copying to prove audiovisual copyright infringement. Id. The
Broderbund court, however, then considered whether the original and copied audiovisuals were
substantially similar for the purpose of completing the court's record. Id. at 1136-37; see infra
note 177 and accompanying text (discussing substantial similarity).
175. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445.
176. Id.
177. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.) (requiring
substantial similarity between works for copyright infringement), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863
(1975); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)
(substantial similarity must exist between original and copied work to find copyright infringe-
ment); see also Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (D.
Del. 1974) (plaintiff must show actual copying plus substantial and material similarity for
copyright infringement).
In establishing proof of direct copying, the Fourth Circuit in Kramer correctly determined
that the inclusion of "common errors" in the programs of both the original and copied works
helps establish proof of direct copying. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 446 (common errors indicative
of copying); see also College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 875 (2d
Cir. 1941) (common errors help show actual copying); Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling
Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 0(. Del. 1974) (common errors show actual copying); 3
M. Nmm R, supra note 20, § 13.03[C], at 13-44 (common errors provide substantial proof of
actual copying).
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Salkeld 18 the Third Circuit considered whether the defendant had infringed
the plaintiff's copyright on a wall chart.17 9 In Salkeld the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had copied an exercise chart containing certain designs. 180
The Third Circuit found that to establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff
first must prove that the defendant copied the copyrighted work, and then
must establish that a substantial similarity existed between the copyrighted
work and the copy.181 Although the Salkeld court found that the plaintiff
could use a substantial similarity test between the works to assist in proving
that the defendant had copied the protected work, the court reasoned that
copyright infringement occurs only if the defendant's copying constituted
an improper appropriation of the work.12 The Third Circuit found that
although courts should apply a substantial similarity test to allow a plaintiff
to prove copying through indirect evidence, a stricter substantial similarity
test applies after a finding that copying occurred.8 3 The Salkeld court
concluded that even if direct proof of copying was available, a court should
not find copyright infringement unless a substantial similarity existed between
copied works." 4
Because the Fourth Circuit in Kramer did not require that a substantial
similarity exist between works in copyright infringement actions, Kramer
creates potential situations in which plaintiffs can win audiovisual copyright
infringement actions when no similarities exist between the original and
copied audiovisuals."5- Under the 1976 Act, copyrights protect only the
178. 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
179. Id. at 907-09.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 907.
182. See id. (no infringement unless copying constituted improper appropriation). Courts
have determined whether an improper appropriation has resulted from copying a work by
considering the immediate reaction of the ordinary person upon seeing the original and copied
works. See id. (applying ordinary observer test); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d
Cir. 1946) (improper appropriation tested from viewpoint of ordinary lay person); 3 M.
NmP4rR, supra note 20, § 13.03[E], at 13-46 (describing "audience" or "ordinary observer"
test).
183. Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907. In determining whether the defendant had copied the
copyrighted work, the Salkeld court applied a substantial similarity test in which the court
looked to see if an ordinary lay person would find a similarity between the two works. Id.;
see supra note 182 (describing ordinary observer test). After determining that copying existed,
however, the Salkeld court found that a stricter substantial similarity test would apply to
determine if an improper appropriation occurred. Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907. Under the stricter
substantial similarity test, the Third Circuit found that a court should dissect works to pinpoint
similarities. Id. But see Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986) (establishing single merged test for substantial similarity when
considering complex copyright issues).
184. See Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907 (requiring substantial similarity between works for
copyright infringement).
185. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445 (falling to require substantial similarity between works
in proof requirements for copyright infringement). Compare Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445 (direct
evidence of copying computer program proves infringement of audiovisual) with Strohon, 564
F. Supp. at 749 (copying program will not necessarily cause infringement of audiovisual if
even slight changes made in program).
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expression of a video game's idea, not the actual idea.1 16 Consequently,
unless a substantial similarity exists between the original and allegedly copied
audiovisuals, no copyright infringement should occur because the allegedly
copied audiovisual embodies a new expression of the video game's idea.
187
Authors should not receive copyright protection over another author's new
expression of the audiovisual's idea. 8' The Kramer court's decision, how-
ever, appears to allow findings of copyright infringement when an author
has copied only the underlying idea of a video game, rather than the
expression of the video game's idea.8 9
In Kramer the Fourth Circuit expanded the scope of protection that the
video game audiovisual copyright affords a copyright holder to include the
underlying computer program to the extent that the program embodied the
186. Atari, 672 F.2d at 615; see supra note I (discussing rule that only expressions of
ideas are copyrightable).
187. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 615 (no copyright infringement unless substantial similarity
between expression of idea).
188. See id. at 615-16 (authors can protect no more than expression of idea).
189. See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445 (expanding methpds to prove infringement of audiovisual
copyright). The potential hazards resulting from the Fourth Circuit's decision allowing a finding
of audiovisual copyright infringement in dissimilar audiovisuals could increase as a result of
a recent decision that reduced the proof requirements for establishing infringement of computer
program copyrights. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237 (reducing proof requirements in computer
program copyright infringement case). In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc. the Third Circuit considered whether a finding of copyright infringement in a computer
program copyright required that the copied computer program embody the same literal elements
as the original program. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233-34. In Whelan Whelan Associates, Inc.
(Whelan) alleged that the defendant had infringed a computer program copyright by creating
a derivative work from Whelan's original program. Id. at 1227; see supra note 90 (discussing
copyrights on derivative works). In establishing similarity between the two programs, the Third
Circuit found that a person could infringe a literary work copyright without copying the
literary work's literal elements, but could not infringe the copyright merely by copying the
plot or plot devices of the literary work. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237. The Whelan court
reasoned that because the Copyright Office protects computer programs with literary work
copyrights, a person could infringe a computer program copyright without copying the
program's literal elements. Id. The Third Circuit concluded, therefore, that copying the
computer program's overall structure could infringe the computer program copyright. Id. The
Whelan decision illustrates the possibility of inequitable results ensuing from Kramer's finding
that proof of program copying establishes audiovisual copyright infringement. See Kramer,
783 F.2d at 445-46 (failing to require proof of substantial similarity between audiovisuals in
finding copyright infringement). The Whelan court eased the proof requirements in finding
infringement of a computer program copyright. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237 (finding proof
of computer program copyright infringement when substantial similarity in overall structure
of computer program exists). The Third Circuit allowed a plaintiff to prove program copying
when only the programs' overall structures appeared similar. See id. The lack of similarity in
the underlying literal elements of the program can result in completely dissimilar audiovisuals.
See Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749 (even slight changes in computer program can cause great
change in program's output). The Kramer decision, however, would allow courts to find
audiovisual copyright infringement when even great dissimilarities exist between audiovisuals.
See Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445 (finding proof of audiovisual copyright infringement upon
showing copying of computer program).
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expression of the audiovisual. 190 After finding that the audiovisual copyright
protected both the audiovisual and computer program, the Fourth Circuit
reduced the standards necessary for proving audiovisual copyright infringe-
ment by allowing proof of copying the computer program to establish
infringement of the audiovisual copyright.' 9' In holding that the video game
audiovisual copyright protects both the audiovisual and the underlying
computer program, the Kramer decision conflicts with the Copyright Office's
practice of requiring separate copyright registrations in a video game audi-
ovisual and underlying computer program. 92 Because the Fourth Circuit's
decision does not affect the Copyright Office's practice of issuing separate
copyright registrations on a video game audiovisual and underlying computer
program, 93 the Fourth Circuit has created the possibility of increased
litigation between holders of video game audiovisual copyrights and holders
of computer program copyrights because both copyright holders can claim
rights in the computer program. 94 In addition, by extending the protection
that the audiovisual copyright provides the audiovisual copyright holder to
the underlying computer program, Kramer increases substantially the rights
of the audiovisual copyright holder to include rights in the computer
program.1 95 Finally, by reducing the burden of proof that an audiovisual
copyright holder must meet to establish infringement of the audiovisual
copyright,' 96 the Kramer decision may allow audiovisual copyright holders
to recover for copyright infringement even if the infringing audiovisual is
completely dissimilar to the original audiovisual. 97
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.
190. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 442.
191. Id. at 445.
192. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text (discussing Copyright Office practices
regarding separate registration of video game audiovisuals and computer programs).
193. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing Copyright Office practices).
194. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text (discussing problems associated with
implementing Kramer court's decision extending scope of audiovisual copyright protection).
195. See supra notes 156-84 and accompanying text (discussing increased protection that
audiovisual copyright holder receives under Kramer decision).
196. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text (discussing Kramer court's proof
requirements for establishing audiovisual copyright infringement).
197. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (making small changes in computer
program can result in completely different audiovisual).
[Vol. 44:505
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
B. Unit Publication: The Evolution of a Doctrine
Under section 401(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976' (1976 Act), an author
must include notice of copyright on his work.2 Failure to comply with the
statutory requirement may result in release of the work to the public
domain.' The federal courts must determine the level of compliance with
the notice requirement that constitutes sufficient notice.4 Strict application
of the statute results in technical forfeitures, benefit to the copyright
infringer, and harm to the copyright holder.' In Koontz v. Jaffarian,6 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the concept
that other federal courts had recognized as a solution to the resulting
inequity of strict statutory interpretation. 7 The Fourth Circuit identified the
1. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 401(a)(1982). Section 401(a) requires a visually
perceivable notice of copyright on all publicly distributed copies of a work protected under
the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), Id. Section 401(b) specifies the requisite form of notice.
Id. § 401(b). First, notice of copyright must include the letter "c" in a circle, or the word
"Copyright", or the abbreviation "Copr.". Id. Second, copyright notice must contain the
year of the first publication of the item. Id. The statute permits omission of the year of
publication for a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work and identifies greeting cards, postcards,
stationery, jewelry, dolls and toys as examples of articles not requiring the year of first
publication in the copyright notice. Id. Finally, for effective notice of copyright, the copyright
owner's name or an alternative generally known designation must appear in the notice. Id.
Under the 1976 Act, the notice requirement serves four functions. H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 [hereinafter 1976 HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CoNo. & ADmI. NEws 5659, 5759. First, the notice of copyright places in the public domain
published material that no one wants to copyright. Id. Second, the copyright notice informs
the public of the copyright status of the work. Id. Third, the copyright notice identifies the
copyright owner. Id. Finally, notice of copyright indicates the date of publication. Id.
3. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (specifying effect of omission
of copyright on owner). Section 405(a) of the 1976 Act provides for three circumstances in
which the copyright holder may not lose the copyright in a work despite the omission of notice
from the work. Id. For example, the copyright holder will not lose the copyright if only
relatively few copies lacked notice, or if registration for the work occurs within five years
after publication without notice and the holder makes a reasonable effort to add notice to the
distributed copies. Id. The copyright will also remain valid if the omission violates an express
written agreement that as a condition of the copyright holder's authorization of distribution,
the copies would contain notice of copyright. Id. The Copyright Act of 1909 contained no
similar provision. Copyright Act of 1909, ch.320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)(current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982)). See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d
276, 277 (2d Cir. 1934)(finding that under 1909 Act, publication without notice waives right
to preserve monopoly and results in dedication of work to public); Smith v. Bartlett, 18 F.
Supp. 35, 37 (D. Me. 1937)(same).
4. See infra notes 20-148 and accompanying text (review of cases interpreting and
applying notice requirement).
5. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing cases that illustrate inequit-
able results of strict application of statutory notice requirement).
6. 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986).
7. Id. at 909; See M. NnmmR, A TREATISE ON T LAW OF LrrTERAY, MusIcAL AND
ARTISTIc PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 7.10, at 7-64 to 7-66 (1986) (courts have
found that only one notice is necessary for all works in single commercial unit); infra notes
22-115 and accompanying text (discussing cases prior to Koontz v. Jaffarian applying concept
of unit publication).
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concept as the doctrine of unit publication. 8 The unit publication doctrine
embodies the notion that one notice of copyright gives copyright protection
to all component parts of a single commercial unit if the parts are integral
or essential to the unit.
9
The statutory notice requirement has evolved from a strict statutory
construction and corresponding strict judicial interpretation of the author's
notice requirement to a more lenient standard.'0 For example, a comparison
8. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909; see Koontz v. Jaffarian, 31 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIoHT
J. (BNA) 523 (Apr. 17, 1986) (describing procedure and substance of Koontz); Koontz v.
Jaffarian, 30 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 121 (June 6, 1985) (describing district
court's decision in Koontz). Prior to Koontz v. Jaffarian, no court had identified expressly
the concept of one notice of copyright protecting the elements of a work as the equitable
doctrine of unit publication. See infra notes 22-115 and accompanying text (discussion of
earlier cases applying concept of unit publication). The plaintiff, Koontz, presented the doctrine
to the district court. Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd,
787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986). The defendant, Jaffarian, argued that Koontz had fabricated
the doctrine of unit publication and that the doctrine had no legal validity. Brief for Richard
Jaffarian Associates, Inc. and Richard Jaffarian, Defendants - Appellants at 6, Koontz v.
Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1765). Jaffarian argued that Koontz had
concocted the unit publication doctrine to create a cause of action that did not exist. Id. at
31. Jaffarian noted that Koontz had no statutory, case law, or literary support for the unit
publication doctrine. Id. at 28. Koontz countered with case law supporting the concept of the
doctrine. Brief for Dennis W. Koontz and Master Service Co. - Appellees at 36-39, Kooitz v.
Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986)(No. 85-1765). Koontz also argued that the Copyright
Office recognized the legal doctrine of unit publication. Id. at 41. Koontz presented § 1013.15
of the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices as evidence of the Copyright Office's
acknowledgement of the doctrine. CoMPENru  OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 1013.15
(1984). Section 1013.15 states that a single notice of copyright is sufficient for a multi-part
work if notice is affixed in a manner and location that gives reasonable notice of the copyright
claim to the entire unit of publication. Id. Jaffarian argued that § 1013.15 did not apply for
two reasons. Defendant's Brief at 37, Koontz (No. 85-1765). First, Jaffarian asserted that the
components did not have the same publication dates. Id. Jaffarian also asserted that all of
the components did not share the same publisher and in all of the examples in § 1013.15, the
components had the same publisher. Id. at 38.
The district court conceded that no statutory recognition of the unit publication doctrine
exists. Koontz, 617 F. Supp. at 1112. The district court also noted that the federal courts had
developed a rule that notice of copyright on one element of a publication gives copyright
protection to all elements of the publication when the elements of publication are integral or
essential to each other. Id. The district court adopted the federal courts' rule. Id. In affirming
the district court's judgment, the Fourth Circuit adopted the district court's reasoning Koontz,
787 F.2d at 907-10. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit recognized the doctrine of unit publication.
Id. at 909.
9. See Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909 (defining and discussing unit publication doctrine).
10. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124 (exemplifying strict statutory
construction). Although it did not require actual notice on the work, the first federal copyright
act required registration and publication of notice of copyright in at least one newspaper for
four weeks. Id. Subsequently, the Act of April 29, 1802 required placement of the author's
name, state of residence, the Act of Congress under which the claim was made, and the date
of registration of the claim on either the title page or the following page. Act of Apr. 29,
1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171. The Act of February 3, 1831 reduced the notice requirement
to read: "[e]ntered according to Act of Congress, in the year , . . . in the clerk's office
of the district court of __ .". Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436, 437. The Acts
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of statutory language from the two most recent federal copyright laws
illustrates the noticeable shift in attitude in favor of the copyright owner.'1
The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) set forth strict standards with which
the copyright holder had to comply.' 2 Failure to include notice of copyright
after publication resulted in the work entering the public domain. 3 The
of 1802 and 1831 required notice to be on the face of non-book items. Act of Apr. 29, 1802,
ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436, 437. The revision
in 1870 provided for less severe requirements in the case of a map, chart, musical composition,
print, cut, engraving, photograph, painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary or model, and
a design. Revision of 1870, ch. 230, § 100, 16 Stat. 198, 214. In situations involving less
stringent notice requirements, notice could be on some portion of the face or front of the
substance upon which the work was mounted. Id. The Act of June 18, 1874 introduced the
short form notice: "Copyright, 18 -, by A.B.". Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 1, 18
Stat. 78, 79. The statute continued to require notice on either the title page or the following
page of the work. Id. The notice requirement on non-literary items became less strict and
notice could be on some visible part of the item or on the substance on which the author
mounted the item. Id. With enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), the notice
requirement changed. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982)). For periodicals, the author could place notice under the masthead.
Id. Furthermore, Congress recognized six additional classes of work that did not require
inclusion of the year of publication, including maps, photographs, and reproductions of works
of art. Id. at 1079. In addition, the 1909 Act permitted abbreviation of the copyright holder's
name to initials or some other mark, providing that the full name appeared elsewhere on the
work. Id. The 1976 Act empowers the Register of Copyrights to specify a list of suitable
locations for notice of copyright. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144. The list is not
exhaustive. Id. Consequently, notice placed in a manner not specified on the list may be
effective if reasonable notice of the copyright claim results. Id. The House Report noted that
errors or omissions in notice should not cause outright forfeiture. Id. Omission of notice does
not invalidate a copyright. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982) (identifying
circumstances when omission of notice is not fatal to copyright); supra note 2 and accompanying
text (discussing statutory notice requirements for 1976 Act); infra notes 15-19 and accompanying
text (cases demonstrating strict judicial interpretation of notice requirement); infra notes 22-
148 and accompanying text (cases exemplifying lenient judicial interpretation of notice require-
ment).
11. See A. LATMAN, THE CoPYluor~r LAW: HowE's CoPYIoirr LAw REvisED AND Tim
1976 ACT 122 (5th ed. 1979) (asserting that comparison of statutory language reveals shift in
congressional attitude toward author). The language of the Act of 1874 reveals congressional
disapproval of copyright protection: "No person shall be entitled to a copyright unless he
shall .... ". Rev. Stat. § 4956 (emphasis added). The corresponding provisions in the Copyright
Act of 1909 provide that: "Any person entitled thereto by this Act may secure copyright for
his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this Act . .. ."
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (1909)(current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 401(a) (1982)) (emphasis added). The Copyright Act of 1976 extends congressional acceptance
of copyright to read "Whenever a work protected under this title is published . . . a notice
of copyright . . . shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies . . ." Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 401(a)(1982) (emphasis added); see infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text
(comparing language of 1909 Act with language of 1976 Act).
12. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982)) (setting forth statutory standards of compliance with notice require-
ment); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing notice requirement of 1909
Act).
13. See Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§
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1976 Act, which supersedes the 1909 Act, includes more lenient provisions
regarding omission of notice by providing three circumstances in which the
copyright holder could omit notice, yet retain the copyright. 14 Early decisions
reflected strict adherence to the notice requirement." For example, in 1903,
the United States Supreme Court in Mifflin v. R.H. White Co.' 6 rejected
outright the notion that less than absolute compliance with the statutory
notice requirements would suffice.'7 The Supreme Court in Mifflin held that
the burden of informing the public of a copyright rested entirely with the
copyright holder and the public had no duty to look beyond the face of
the notice. 8 As a consequence of early legislation and judicial interpretation
similar to Mifflin, the omission, imperfection, or misplacement of notice
could result in the author's work entering the public domain. 9
The harsh results of strictly construing congressional enactments has
prompted some federal courts to apply an equitable remedy to rectify the
101-914 (1982)); Roth, Is Notice Necessary? An Analysis of the Notice Provisions of the
Copyright Law Revision, 27 CoPYRiGrr L. Sym'. (ASCAP) 245 (1982) (discussing effect of
publication without notice of copyright under 1909 Act).
14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing procedures in 1976 Act to avoid
invalidation of copyright). The 1976 Act applies to causes of action accruing after January 1,
1978. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Booth v. Haggard, 184 F.2d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1950)(notice of copyright
invalid due to placement on third page instead of first or second page); Deward & Rich, Inc.
v. Bristol Say. & Loan Co., 34 F. Supp. 345, 348 (W.D. Va. 1940), aff'd, 120 F.2d 537, 540
(4th Cir. 1941)(finding use of encircled "C" insufficient when statute required either "Copy-
right" or "Copyr."); United Thrift Plan, Inc. v. National Thrift Plan, Inc., 34 F.2d 300, 302
(E.D.N.Y. 1929)(notice on back of 10-page booklet invalid due to improper placement);
Freeman v. The Trade Register, Inc., 173 F. 419, 425 (W.D. Wash. 1909)(copyright holder
has no cause of action for admitted copying due to court's finding that page on which notice
appeared is not title page); J.A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, 23 F. Supp. 619, 620
(S.D.N.Y. 1938)(finding that explicit statutory provisions render notice on back cover of book
insufficient). See generally A. LA m", supra note 11, at 134 (discussing severity of 1909 Act).
16. 190 U.S. 260 (1903).
17. Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 264 (1903). In Mifflin v. R.H. White Co.,
Houghton, Mifflin & Company, acting as the assignees of Oliver Wendell Holmes (Holmes),
brought an action against the R.H. White Company for violation of the copyright on Holmes'
"Professor at the Breakfast Table". Id. at 260. The publishers of the Atlantic Monthly
magazine, Ticknor & Fields, reproduced Holmes' work in ten sections over ten months. Id.
at 261. Ticknor & Fields registered a copyright for the Atlantic Monthly in the name of
Ticknor & Fields. Id. at 263. Oliver Wendell Holmes registered a copyright for "Professor at
the Breakfast Table" in his own name. Id.
In applying the Copyright Act of 1831, the Court reasoned that the object of copyright
notice is to warn the public against republishing a specific book by a specific author or holder
of the copyright. Id. at 264. The Mifflin Court found that the two notices revealed different
titles and different copyright owners. Id. Further, the Mifflin Court rejected the argument
that notice is sufficient if the public recognizes that someone owns a copyright. Id. The
Supreme Court concluded that because the right to copyright protection is statutory, the public
may demand that the holder comply with the precise statutory guidelines to obtain the copyright.
Id.
18. Mifflin, 190 U.S. at 264.
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (cases illustrating strict statutory interpre-
tation).
[Vol. 44:505
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
otherwise severe consequences to the copyright owner resulting from insuf-
ficient notice.20 Specifically, federal courts have applied the concept of the
unit publication doctrine when strict construction of the statutory notice
requirement would produce an unjust outcome.21 For example, in 1913 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Lydiard-Peterson
Co. v. Woodman,22 considered the issue of intentional copyright infringe-
ment. 23 In Woodman, Woodman had created a directory and a map of the
property surrounding Lake Minnetonka, Minnesota. 24 The map, which fit
in the front pocket of the directory, referenced figures explained in the
directory.25 The directory and the map contained notices of copyright, but
only the copyright in the directory was valid.26 The Lydiard-Peterson Com-
pany reproduced, printed and sold the map. 27 In upholding the strict notice
guidelines of the Act of 1874, the Eighth Circuit maintained that certain
vital information was missing from the notice on the map and, therefore,
the notice on the map was invalid.21 Next, the Woodman court developed
an equitable theory to preserve Woodman's copyright in the map-directory. 29
The Eighth Circuit found that the map-directory constituted one publication
20. See Coventry Ware, Inc. v. Reliance Picture Frame Co., 288 F.2d 193, 195 (2d
Cir.)(finding notice of copyright sufficient if positioned to notify anyone seeking to copy
work), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 818 (1961); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-
Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)(holding that insubstantial variations from
statutory requirements will not relinquish copyright holder's rights). See generally A. LATAN,
supra note 11, at 122 (noting development of judicial tolerance to immaterial errors regarding
notice).
21. See infra notes 22-115 and accompanying text (discussion of cases applying unit
publication doctrine).
22. 204 F. 921 (8th Cir. 1913).
23. Id. An intentional copyright infringer is one who copies a work with knowledge of
copyright protection on the item. See Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d
851, 854 (2d Cir. 1967)(court found defendant to be an intentional infringer when infringer
was aware of copyright on work), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 801 (1967).
24. Woodman, 204 F. at 923.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 924 (finding valid copyright notice on directory only); see also infra note
28 and accompanying text (explaining why Eighth Circuit in Lydiard-Peterson Co. v. Woodman
found notice on map invalid).
27. Woodman, 204 F. at 922.
28. Id. at 924 (determining that notices on map were insufficient). In Lydiard-Peterson
Co. v. Woodman, the map contained two separate attempts at copyright notice. Id. at 923.
The first attempt appeared as "Woodman's Minnetonka Map-Directory. Copyright 1908.
Drawn by J.C. Woodman" on the map. Id. Next, "Published by Woodman Publishing Co.,
841 Lumber Exchange Building, Minneapolis, Minn. Red figures refer to Index Book with ten
special books. Price including book, $3.00 postpaid" also appeared on the map. Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that the notices on the map were insufficient because Prentiss M. Woodman,
the author of the copyrighted work, and J.C. Woodman, the draftsman of the map, lived in
the same city and shared the same business address. Id. at 924. Consequently, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that the "Woodman" referenced in the notices would imply J.C. Woodman,
the draftsman, when Prentiss M. Woodman was the actual holder of the copyright. Id.
29. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing Woodman court's application
of equitable theory to preserve copyright).
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and that notice on the directory was sufficient for the publication. 0
In identifying the map-directory as one publication, the Eighth Circuit
found that the directory was integral to the map.31 Examination of the facts
indicates that the Woodman court struggled to find the directory integral
to the map.32 Woodman published one thousand maps and five hundred
directories. 33 Five hundred extra maps were published without a directory.
3 4
The map was useful without the directory and therefore, the directory was
not integral to the map.3s Although the language of the Act of 1874 set
out strict notice requirements, the Eighth Circuit reasoned around the notice
requirements by applying the concept of unit publication.
6
Congress adjusted the Act of 1874 notice requirement in the 1909 Act
to allow for alternative notice provisions for specified items.3 7 In 1937 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the
sufficiency of notice under the 1909 Act in Patterson v. Century Produc-
tions, Inc. 3 Patterson compiled eight reels of African wild animal footage
to create a motion picture.3 9 Patterson placed a notice of copyright on the
first reel of film only.4° The defendant obtained and duplicated the film
and used a portion of the film in another motion picture. 41 The defendant
argued that because notice of copyright did not appear on each reel of
film, the notice of copyright was invalid.4 2 Stating that the film was separated
into eight parts for convenience in handling, the Second Circuit reasoned
that Patterson copyrighted all eight reels as a unit and that a single notice
of copyright protected the unit.43 The Patterson court held that a single
30. Woodman, 204 F. at 924 (finding hyphenated word "map-directory" on map and
directory as evidence that one is incomplete without other).
31. Id.
32. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Lydiard-Peterson
Co. v. Woodman); infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (same).
33. Woodman, 204 F. at 925.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Lydiard-Peterson Co. v. Woodman chose not to address
the discrepancy in the number of maps and directories. Id. Instead, the Woodman court
declared that the parties had agreed to address only the issue of notice and were unable to
address other issues on appeal. Id. The Woodman court further justified avoiding the
discrepancy issue by declaring that the district court already had decided the issue. Id.
36. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text (describing Woodman court's appli-
cation of unit publication doctrine).
37. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing development of copyright law).
38. 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938).
39. See id. at 491 (Patterson filmed wild animals for motion picture called Shooting Big
Game With A Camera).
40. See id. (notice of copyright read "Copyright 1928 by F.B. Patterson, Pres. of
National Cash Register Co.").
41. See id. (defendant incorporated copied footage into motion picture called The Jungle
Killer).
42. Id. at 493.
43. See id. (finding single notice of copyright sufficient). The court in Patterson v.
Century Products, Inc. stated that absent express statutory provisions requiring notice of
copyright on every reel, one notice of copyright satisfied the notice requirement for all eight
reels. Id.
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notice of copyright would suffice as notice for the eight reels of film. 4 The
Second Circuit noted, however, that Patterson had presented fewer than all
eight reels at a showing. 4 The Second Circuit's opinion suggests that two
facts were damaging to the copier's position. 46 First, the original owner,
Patterson, was showing the films as a non-profit activity to religious, social,
and educational organizations. 47 Condoning intentional infringement by
requiring notice on all eight films would contravene the public policy of
promoting charitable activity 8 Next, when the copier acquired a copy of
the entire film, he saw but disregarded the copyright notice.49 The copier,
therefore, intentionally infringed Patterson's copyright. 50 If the Second
Circuit rigidly had applied the notice requirement of the 1909 Act, the film
would have entered the public domain.5 1 Although the 1909 Act set out
strict provisions, the Second Circuit circumvented the provisions by applying
the equitable theory of unit publication.
2
In 1958 the Second Circuit modified again the strict statutory require-
ments in another case of intentional copyright infringement. 3 In Boucher
v. Du Boyes, Inc.,54 Du Boyes copied earrings that Boucher had designed
and copyrighted.5 5 The copier argued that both earrings in a pair had to
contain a notice of copyright because one earring was useful separately as
an ornament or clip.56 The Second Circuit rejected the argument and stated
that earrings are sold in a pair, as a unit, and simply because earrings might
be useful separately, earrings are not separate works of art.5 7 The Second
Circuit, therefore, concluded that each earring did not require individual
notice. 8 Boucher exemplifies the federal courts' willingness to apply the
concept of unit publication when the work consists of identical components. 59
44. Id.
45. Id. at 491.
46. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (examining facts damaging to infringer
in Patterson v. Century Products, Inc.).
47. Patterson, 93 F.2d at 491.
48. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing application of equitable remedy
to guard against unjust results).
49. See id. (Patterson court implied that defendant copied plaintiff's film with knowledge
of copyright).
50. Id; see supra note 23 and accompanying text (defining intentional infringer).
51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing strict notice requirements under
1909 Act).
52. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's application
of unit publication doctrine to achieve equitable result).
53. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing modification of 1909 Act
notice requirement in Boucher v. Du Boyes, Inc.).
54. 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958).




59. Id. The Second Circuit in Boucher v. Du Boyes awarded additional attorney's fees
to the plaintiff due to the deliberate nature of the infringement and the lack of merit to the
defendant's issues on appeal. Id. at 950. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text
(illustrating Boucher court's equitable interpretation of 1909 Act).
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Another interpretation of the notice requirement in the 1909 Act arose
in 1959 when the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York considered the sufficiency of notice of a work composed of
physically connected elements.60 In Scarves By Vera, Inc. v. United Mer-
chants and Manufacturers, Inc.,61 the copyright owner, Scarves By Vera,
Inc., manufactured three designs as prints for women's blouses 2 Each
blouse included two imprints of the same design, one imprint on the front
and one imprint on the back.6 In upholding the copyright holder's claim
of infringement, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York reasoned that two copies of the same design on a shirt were
a unit and that one notice sufficed to protect the whole shirt." The district
court's decision in Scarves By Vera supported the post-1909 Act movement
away from the notice requirement on each repetition of a copyrighted
design.6
60. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing application of unit publi-
cation doctrine when work comprises physically connected parts); cf. Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617
F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (E.D. Va. 1985) (noting that unit publication also applies in cases involving
no physical connection of components), aff'd, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986).
61. 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
62. Id. at 627.
63. Id. at 628.
64. See id. (discussing sufficiency of one notice of copyright to protect shirt with two
design imprints). The court in Scarves By Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants and Manufacturers,
Inc. maintained that a notice reading "Vera" accompanied by an encircled "C" did not render
notice invalid even though the Copyright Act of 1909 required the full name of the copyright
holder, "Scarves By Vera, Inc.". Id.; see Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 18, 35 Stat. 1075,
1079 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(3) (1982)) (requiring full name of copyright
holder to appear on accessible portion of work). In upholding the abbreviated copyright notice,
the Scarves By Vera court reasoned that the plaintiff was a large and well-established leader
in the field of women's clothes and that the abbreviated form of the company's name would
not mislead an innocent person. Scarves By Vera, 173 F. Supp. at 628. Further, the district
court found that the abbreviated notice of copyright constituted substantial compliance with
the statutory requirement. Id.
Notice of copyright appeared on a cardboard hangtag attached to the shirt and on a
woven label sewn into the side of the shirt. Id. at 627-28. The district court found that the
hangtag did not meet the statutory notice requirement. Id. at 628. The Scarves By Vera court
found, however, that the label sewn into a side seam was valid, although not sewn on the
neck or other obvious place, because the placement was sufficiently obvious to notify anyone
looking for a copyright. Id.
65. See Scarves By Vera, 173 F. Supp. at 628 (determining that single notice satisfactory
for work bearing two imprints of same design); cf. DeJonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co.,
235 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1914)(finding that notice was required on each repetition of design on gift
wrapping paper); H.M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70, 72 n.2 (2d Cir. 1963)
(distinguishing Dejonge on grounds that composite design at issue in Kolbe, consisting of
alternating inversions of design, depended upon arrangement of figures on fabric and only
required single notice). Commentators suggest that the distinction claimed by the Kolbe court
may be artificial. M. NnnsmR, supra note 7, at § 7.10[D]. The Kolbe court offered no rationale
for finding that the work in DeJonge was a repetition of the design while the work in Kolbe
was a single design. See Kolbe, 315 F.2d at 73 (failing to explain factual difference between
design in Kolbe and DeJonge); see M. Numm, supra note 7, at 7-63 (discussing difficulty in
distinguishing Kolbe and DeJonge).
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Subsequent to the Scarves By Vera determination that a single notice
suffices for physically connected components of a work, the federal courts
continued to extend the liberalization of the 1909 Act notice requirement. 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California in
Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp.67 considered the sufficiency of
copyright notice in an instance when non-identical elements physically
connect to form the entire unit.63 Doran brought an action for copyright
infringement against the defendants. 69 Doran claimed ownership to the
copyright to a three dimensional Santa Claus figure with three component
parts consisting of the hood, the torso and the tunic. 70 The Doran court
reasoned that without any one of the components, the unit could not serve
the intended purpose as a Christmas decoration. 71 The Doran court, there-
fore, concluded that notice of copyright on the hood of a Santa Claus
figure served as sufficient notice for the three component parts of the
figure.7
2
In Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Service Corp.,71 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered the
validity of notice in another instance of physically attached component
parts.74 In Royalty Designs, the plaintiff manufactured and sold plastic
molded coin banks shaped like dogs. 75 Upon finding that defendant's coin
banks were copies, the Royalty Designs court determined that the plug on
the bottom of the bank, on which the copyright appeared, was an essential
part of the bank and without it, the bank could not serve the intended
purpose of storing money.76 The Royalty Designs court concluded that
notice of copyright on the plug was adequate notice for the bank. 77 The
66. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing liberalization of notice
requirement in Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp.).
67. 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
68. Id. at 945-47.
69. Id. at 942.
70. Id. at 943. In Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., both the plaintiff's and the
defendants' Santa Claus figures were virtually identical and sold in similar packaging. Id. at
943. Furthermore, the first shipment of defendant's version contained an instruction sheet
bearing plaintiff's name. Id. Defendant's model sold for less than plaintiff's model. Id.
71. Id. at 947 (noting that Doran sold components as unit and components were not
useful individually).
72. Id.
73. 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
74. Id. at 704.
75. Id. at 703. On both of the plaintiff's coin banks in question in Royalty Designs,
Inc. v. Thrifticheck Service Corp., notice of copyright was on the metal plug that fit into the
bottom of the bank. Id.
76. See id. at 704 (finding that metal stopper was essential component of banks). In
Royalty Desiins, Thrifticheck Service Corporation argued that Royalty Designs, Incorporated
had improperly affixed notice of copyright to the banks. Id. The Royalty Designs court rejected
the defendant's argument and found that the stopper fit securely into the hole on the bottom
of the bank and was removable only by prying the stopper out of the bank. Id.
77. Id.
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federal court decisions in Scarves By Vera, Doran, and Royalty Designs
exemplify strong arguments in favor of allowing a single notice of copyright
to suffice for a unit in which all of the elements are joined physically."
In 1967, after the Scarves By Vera, Doran and Royalty Designs courts
had broadened the notice requirement to permit a single notice to suffice
for a work consisting of physically joined parts, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit further expanded the scope of the
copyright notice requirement.7 9 In Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty
Co.,S° the Second Circuit considered whether the combination of two notices
of copyright represented substantial compliance with the notice requirement
under the 1909 Act."' In Uneeda Doll, the Goldfarb Novelty Company
(Goldfarb Novelty) copied Uneeda Doll Company's (Uneeda Doll) three
and one half inch doll and sold the copied dolls in Walgreen Eastern
Company's stores (Walgreen). 2 Uneeda Doll had placed an abbreviated
notice of copyright on the doll's foot and a full notice of copyright on the
container in which the manufacturer packaged the doll. 3 Uneeda Doll moved
to enjoin Goldfarb Novelty and Walgreen from infringing the copyright on
the doll.8 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York found that the defendants intentionally had infringed the copyright
on Uneeda Doll's toy doll and that the defendant's continued activity
presented a threat of irreparable injury to Uneeda Doll.8 5 The district court
refused to grant injunctive relief, however, because, with the abbreviated
notice on the doll's foot and the full notice on the package, Uneeda Doll
had failed to comply with the notice provisions under the 1909 Act. 6 On
appeal, the Second Circuit appraised the two notices of copyright and
determined that when considered together, the two notices provided suffi-
cient notice to inform innocent persons, those lacking an intent to infringe,
of the existence of the copyright.8 7 The Second Circuit determined that the
container in which the manufacturer packaged the doll was the keeping
place for the doll and, accordingly, the purchaser would not discard the
78. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text (Scarves By Vera, Doran, and Royalty
Designs courts finding that one notice was sufficient when all elements of unit were joined
physically).
79. See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (presenting further expansion of
copyright notice requirement).
80. 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1967).
81. Id. at 853.
82. Id. at 852-53.
83. Id. at 853.
84. Id. at 852.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 852-53 (considering sufficiency of combination of two notices of copyright).
In Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., the copyright notice on the doll's foot read
"U.D. Co. Inc. © 1965". Id. at 853. A notice on the cardboard container read "© Uneeda
Doll Co., Inc. 1966". Id.
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container." The incomplete notice on the doll's foot satisfied the notice
requirement when read in conjunction with the copyright notice on the
cardboard container. s9 The Second Circuit reasoned that the notice of
copyright on the container was sufficient because the container is the
substance on which the manufacturer mounted the dolls and, accordingly,
complied with the statutory provisionP° The Uneeda Doll court further
noted that a notice of copyright longer than the short form of notice could
disfigure the three and one half inch doll. 9' Finally, the Second Circuit held
that the claim of insufficient notice was not available to the willful infrin-
ger.92 The Second Circuit stretched the boundary of the statutory notice
requirement to find that an abbreviated notice of copyright on the work
constituted adequate compliance under the 1909 Act when read in conjunc-
tion with the full notice of copyright on the cardboard container packaging
the work. 93
The level of sufficient notice under the 1909 Act was interpreted even
more broadly by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in 1974. 94 In Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp.9s, the Sixth
Circuit considered the sufficiency of notice of copyright for an item when
no notice appeared anywhere on the item.96 Monogram Models, Incorporated
(Monogram Models) brought an infringement action against Industro Motive
Corporation (Industro Motive) for copyright infringement of two model
airplane kits.97 Monogram Models had placed notice of copyright on the
88. Id. at 853. In Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., the package containing
the doll consisted of cardboard with a three-sided transparent plastic window. Id. The Uneeda
Doll court determined that the package was the "keeping place" for the doll. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. (finding that statutory notice requirement was satisfied). As provided in
section 18 of the Copyright Act of 1909, notice of copyright may appear on the substance on
which the author mounts the work. Id.; see Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 18, 35 Stat.
1075, 1079 (1909)(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1982)). In Uneeda Doll Co. v.
Goldfarb Novelty Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined
that the package on which the notice of copyright appeared was the substance on which the
Uneeda Doll Company mounted the dolls. Uneeda Doll, 373 F.2d at 853.
91. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1909 (providing for short form
of notice of copyright to avoid disfigurement of work); supra note 10 (describing statutory
short form provision).
92. Uneeda Doll, 373 F.2d at 854; see supra note 85 and accompanying text (Uneeda
Doll court finding intentional infringement); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309
F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962) (willful infringer cannot claim insufficiency of notice); National
Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 601 (2d Cir. 1951) (same); supra
note 23 (defining intentional infringer).
93. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text (discussing innovative application of
unit publication doctrine in Uneeda Doll).
94. See Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (6th
Cir.) (liberal interpretation of 1909 Act), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974); see also infra
notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing Monogram Models).
95. 492 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974).
96. Id. at 1282-85.
97. Id. at 1282.
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boxes and on the instruction sheets of the kits.98 Industro Motive argued
that Monogram Models' notice of copyright was invalid.9 The Monogram
Models court disagreed and concluded that notice of copyright need not
appear on each of the parts of a plastic model airplane kit.100 Having
determined that Industro Motive had stolen Monogram Models' designs,
the Sixth Circuit found that copyright notice on the container and instruction
sheet was sufficient for the entire kit because the box and instructions were
integral parts of the model airplanes. 10 1
The Uneeda Doll and Monogram Models decisions upholding the suf-
ficiency of copyright notice are contrary to the cases finding that notice on
a sales flyer or a cardboard hangtag is insufficient.' °2 The Uneeda Doll
court found that the cardboard package was the keeping place for the
doll. 03 The Monogram Models court found that the instruction sheet and
cardboard box was part of the model airplane kit. t04 Arguably, the notice
on the box in Uneeda Doll and the notice on the box and instruction sheet
in Monogram Models were detachable and discardable.1 5 In the cases finding
that notice on a flyer or hangtag was insufficient, the federal courts have
reasoned that the purchaser will discard the flyer or hangtag and conse-
quently, discard the notice of copyright.1 6 For example, in Shapiro & Sons
Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Associates,17 Shapiro & Sons Bedspread
Corporation (Shapiro) claimed that Royal Mills Associates (Royal Mills)
had copied a bedspread fabric pattern to which Shapiro owned the copy-
98. Id. at 1284. One of the two model airplanes in question in Monogram Models, Inc.
v. Industro Motive Corp. contained notice of copyright on the inside of a wing part, but the
notice was not visible after assembly. Id.
99. Id. Industro Motive contended that Monogram Model's notice of copyright on the
container boxes and instruction sheets did not comply with the requirement in the 1909 Act
that notice must be affixed to each copy. Id. at 1284. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9,
35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § (1982).
100. Id. at 1285.
101. Id. at 1284.
102. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing insufficiency of notice on
sales flyers and cardboard hangtags); supra note 64 (discussing insufficiency of cardboard tag).
103. Uneeda Doll, 373 F.2d at 853. See supra note 88 (discussing package as keeping
place for doll).
104. Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1285.
105. See supra note 7, at 7.10[C], at 7-62 to 7-62.1 (wrapper or container on which notice
appeared is discardable); supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text (discussing placement of
notice of copyright in Uneeda Doll and Monogram Models); infra notes 111-15 and accom-
panying text (same).
106. See Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assoc., 568 F. Supp. 972, 975
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)(sales flyer enclosed with bedspread is not integral part of bedspread because
purchaser disregards flyer when unwrapping bedspread); Scarves By Vera, 173 F. Supp. at 628
(stating that hangtag bearing notice falls short of statutory requirement); Trifari, Krussman &
Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)(same); supra
note 64 and accompanying text (discussing copyright notice in Scarves By Vera); see also M.
NnamR, supra note 7, at 7-61 to 7-62.1 (examining cases involving detachable tags).
107. 568 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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right. 08 Shapiro argued that notice of copyright on the sales flyer enclosed
with the bedspread was sufficient.1o9 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York rejected Shapiro's argument, holding
that notice on a flyer was ineffective because the sales flyer is not an
integral part of the bedspread, and the purchaser discards the flyer when
unwrapping the bedspread.110 Applying the Shapiro court's reasoning to the
facts in Monogram Models and Uneeda Doll produces a different outcome
than that which resulted in the two cases.' Rather than finding that the
purchaser would discard the doll's container, the Uneeda Doll court claimed
that a box was a "keeping place" for a doll." 2 Similarly, the Monogram
Models court claimed that a cardboard box and instruction sheet were
integral to a model airplane." 3 As the Monogram Models court stated, the
copyright notices on the model airplane instruction sheet and container were
apparent to anyone looking for the documentation of notice." 4 By applying
to the copyright holder a standard of substantial compliance, the Uneeda
Doll and Monogram Models courts tailored the facts to comply with the
1909 Act."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed a
similarity between the relationship of the instruction sheet to the model
airplane in Monogram Models and the relationship of the user manual to the
computer software in Koontz v. Jaffarian"6 to apply the unit publication
doctrine under the 1976 Act." 7 In Koontz, plaintiff Koontz published and
copyrighted a manual containing data used in preparing electrical contracting
bids."' The Hewlett-Packard Company (H-P) agreed with Koontz that H-P
108. Id. at 974.
109. Id. at 974.
110. Id. at 975-76.
111. Compare Shapiro, 568 F. Supp. at 975-76 (sales flyer integral part of bedspread)
with Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1284 (cardboard box and instruction sheet are part of
airplane kit) and Uneeda Doll, 373 F.2d at 853 (cardboard container is doll's keeping place);
see supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussion of reasoning behind insufficiency of
notice on sales flyer).
112. Uneeda Doll, 373 F.2d at 853; see supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text
(presenting Uneeda Doll court's reasoning).
113. Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1284; supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text
(discussion of Monogram Models court's reasoning).
114. Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1285.
115. See supra notes 79-101 and accompanying text (discussion of Uneeda Doll and
Monogram Models courts' equitable construction of statutory notice requirement).
116. 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986).
117. See Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909 (for all intents and purposes, manual is instruction
sheet for software); Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1284 (instruction sheets are integral parts
of model airplane kit); infra notes 118-38 and accompanying text (discussing Koontz); supra
notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing 1976 Act).
118. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 907. In Koontz v. Jaffarian, the copyrighted manual contained
a comprehensive data compilation of the price of over 57,000 items used in electrical construc-
tion and the time required for installation of the items. Id. Koontz revised the manual three
times and copyrighted the manual with each revision. Id. at 908.
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would compensate Koontz if he would help H-P develop a computer program
to replicate the electrical estimating system." 9 Koontz agreed to supply his
manual as part of the system. 2° The electrical estimating program and an
abbreviated version of the extensive data compilation were stored on magnetic
tape.' 2' The programf and data compilation on tape provided the user with
an estimate that required decoding with Koontz' manual.'2 The magnetic
tape, the program, and the data contained no notice of copyright.'2 When
the estimating package failed to market successfully, Koontz' relationship
with H-P terminated.?24 Koontz subsequently formed a joint venture with
Glen Labbie, a codefendant, to improve and update the package.'2 The
updated version included notice of copyright on the manual but not on the
tape. 12' Jaffarian, Koontz' former employee, and Labbie separated from
Koontz and, by copying Koontz' compiled data from the magnetic tape, they
developed another electrical estimating package. 27 Koontz brought an action
against Jaffarian and Labbie for copyright infringement charging that the
defendants had violated Koontz' copyright protection by copying the data
compilation.'2
In affirming the decision of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia that Koontz' copyright was valid and that Labbie
and Jaffarian had infringed upon the copyright, the Fourth Circuit adopted
the doctrine of unit publication. 29 The Fourth Circuit explained that the
purpose of copyright notice is to protect innocent infringers." 0 Because both
Jaffarian and Labbie knew that Koontz had created the data compilation,
the Fourth Circuit could justify applying the unit publication doctrine.'
In adopting the unit publication doctrine, the Fourth Circuit embraced
the district court's reasoning. 32 First, the Fourth Circuit observed that the
119. Id. at 907. In Koontz v. Jaffarian, Koontz agreed to provide the mathematical
algorithms and the data compilations used to develop the electrical estimates. Id. Hewlett-
Packard agreed to develop a computer program to simulate Koontz' manual system. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 908. In Koontz v. Jaffarian, the data compilation on the magnetic tape
appeared as code numbers and abbreviated descriptions because of the limited storage capacity
on the tapes. Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (E.D. Va. 1985). The Koontz
manual contained the necessary conversion charts. Id.
123. Koontz, 617 F. Supp. at 1112.
124. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 908.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. In Koontz v. Jaffarian, the data compilation was accessible to any user and a
user could print out the entire data compilation. Koontz, 617 F. Supp. at 1111.
128. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 908.
129. See id. at 909 (Fourth Circuit adopting unit publication doctrine).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 909 (Koontz court considers wrongful intent of infringer).
132. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's adoption
of district court's reasoning).
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manual and the software were available as a unit. 3 3 Furthermore, the Fourth
Circuit indicated that although a purchaser could buy the manual without
the software, the purchaser could not buy the software without the manual.'34
Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that the average customer could not use
the software without the manual.135 Borrowing language from Monogram
Models, the Koontz court reasoned that the manual was the instruction sheet
for the software and like the instruction sheet in Monogram Models, which
was integral to the model airplane kit, the user manual was integral to the
programming package in Koontz.3 6 Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the purpose of the notice requirement, which is to protect innocent infringers,
was not furthered in Koontz because the infringers were aware of the source
of the data compilation.137 The unit publication doctrine provided the Fourth
Circuit with a rationale to construe liberally the notice requirement and reach
an equitable judgement.'38
Although the doctrine of unit publication resulted in a fair outcome in
Koontz, the doctrine has a limited application to the sufficiency of notice
issue presented in Koontz. 39 The Fourth Circuit applied the doctrine of unit
publication to a circumstance in which the computer program was dependant
upon the user manual for operation.1Y° Specifically, in Koontz the user manual
was necessary to decode the abbreviated information on the screen. 14 Not all
computer programs, however, depend on a decoding manual for operation.142
Many programs assist the user through optional assistance, menus, or tuto-
rials. 4 3 The Fourth Circuit noted that the average user required the manual
133. See Koontz, 787 F.2d at 907-08 (Koontz court refers to program and data compilation
as software). Technically, computer software includes programs, procedures, documents and
the user manual. P. BURTON, A DICTIONARY OF MmncomuTiro AND MicRocomtrTio 2133.10
(1982); J. ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF ComPUTERs 163 (1984). The Fourth Circuit in Koontz
v. Jaffarian refers to computer software and the user manual as distinct items. See Koontz,
787 F.2d at 908 (claiming that customer could calculate estimate with manual and software).
134. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909.
135. Id.
136. See id. (characterizing manual as instruction sheet for program); see Monogram
Models, 492 F.2d at 1284 (finding that instruction sheet was integral part of model airplane
kit).
137. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909.
138. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text (discussion of facts in Koontz); supra
notes 22-115 and accompanying text (cases applying concept of unit publication to avoid unjust
outcome).
139. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (discussing limitations to unit publi-
cation doctrine in copyright protection of computer programs and user manuals).
140. See Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909 (applying doctrine of unit publication when computer
program depended on user manual).
141. See id. (finding that average customer could not use electrical estimating software
without user manual); supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (describing dependency of
computer program on user manual); infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (same).
142. See infra note 143 (examples of computer programs operable without decoding
manuals); cf. supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (examining dependence of computer
program and user manual in Koontz).
143. See LoTus DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Lotus 1-2-3 (1984) (example of menu-driven
program); WORDPERFECT CORPORATION, WORDPERFECT (1985) (same).
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to use the program.'" The Koontz court relied on the user's dependency on
the manual to find that notice on the magnetic tape was sufficient. 45 Further,
alternative commercial manuals are available for the often-used, more popular
programs. 1' The optional commercial manuals effectively sever any depend-
ency that a user may have for the manual.147 The Fourth Circuit thus applied
the unit publication doctrine in Koontz because of the unique fact that the
operation of the program depended solely upon translation from the manual. 14
Since the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia in Koontz, but prior to the Fourth Circuit's affirmation
of the decision in March of 1986, one commentator suggested the doctrine
of unit publication as a solution to another computer law issue. 49 The doctrine
was a proposed answer to the confusion created by the dual requirement of
registering an audiovisual work copyright on the computer screen display and
of registering a literary work copyright on the computer instructions.10 One
proponent of a single copyright requirement maintains that a reasonable
person would assume that one copyright covers the unit, including the screen
display and the computer instructions.' The commentator's proposed appli-
cation of the recently recognized doctrine of unit publication demonstrates
that the doctrine has potential use in the technologically sophisticated area
of computer law. 52
The trend toward a notice requirement more favorable to the copyright
holder results from a changing view by courts of the purpose that a notice
requirement should serve. 53 Historically, courts have justified the notice
144. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909.
145. See id. (average customer required manual to operate program).
146. See SAvAREs, UsiNG LOTUS 1-2-3 (1985)(commercially available user's guide for
software); Hsmsa, MAmUNG DBASE 2 THE EASY WAY (1984)(same).
147. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (exemplifying commercial substitutes for
user manuals).
148. Koontz, 787 F.2d at 909; see supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (explaining
why computer program dependant on user manual in Koontz).
149. See Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38
STAN. L. Rav. 497, 499 (1986) (suggesting unit publication doctrine as answer to questions
raised by copyright of computer programs).
150. See id. at 530 (copyright on computer instructions does not protect screen displays).
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a literary work as "words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia". 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Under the 1976 Act, an audiovisual
work comprises a "series of related images ... together with accompanying sounds, if any".
Id.
151. Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection of Computer Software, supra note
149, at 531. One commentator notes that courts and commentators incorrectly assume that a
copyright on the computer instructions protects against infringement of screen displays. Id.
(citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Comment, Proving Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: An Analytical Framework,
18 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 919, 942, 945 (1985)).
152. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing commentator's application
of doctrine of unit publication in computer law).
153. See infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text (discussing changing goal of copyright
notice requirement).
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requirement in two ways.114 First, the copyright grants to its holder certain
exclusive rights.' Congress looks unfavorably upon the rights as hindering
competition and as granting a monopoly in favor of the copyright holder.1
6
Consequently, courts have demanded strict compliance with the statutory
notice requirement.'5 Specifically, the holder of the copyright must comply
with strict regulations in order to retain the exclusive rights.' 58 The monopoly
theory explains the outcome of earlier decisions that strictly applied the notice
requirements. 59
A second and still developing theory explaining the notice requirement is
that the notice of copyright should prevent infringement by innocent parties.'6
The innocent infringer rationale emphasizes the reasonableness of notice rather
than strict compliance because the copyright notice must only inform the
public of copyright protection.' 6' Under the innocent infringer rationale, the
copyright holder complies with a more liberal notice requirement, and the
goal of informing the innocent infringer endures.'6 The innocent infringer
theory of the statutory notice requirement supports the courts' application of
the doctrine of unit publication. 63
154. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (discussion of justifications for notice
requirement). Some observers suggest abolishing the copyright notice requirement. See Roth,
supra, note 13, at 245 (recommending abolishment of notice requirement). Opponents of the
notice requirement argue that the notice requirement causes unjust forfeitures and are ambig-
uous and impractical. Id. at 261, 273, & 274.
155. See Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260, 263 (1903) (discussing rights granted
to copyright holder).
156. See id. (Supreme Court suggesting congressional disapproval of exclusive rights
created by copyright). But see Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889)(noting that
copyright holder does not have monopoly because of issuance of copyright but instead copyright
statute determines his rights); Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557, 561 (1881)(same).
157. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (cases illustrating strict interpretation
of statutory notice requirement).
158. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing statutory notice requirements).
159. See Defendant's Brief at 35, Koontz (No. 85-1765) (copyright holder must comply
with strict statutory requirements to hold monopoly on his work); supra notes 15-19 and
accompanying text (discussing earlier cases strictly applying notice requirement).
160. See Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1285 (determining that purpose of notice
requirement is to advise public of copyright and to prevent innocent persons from accidental
infringement); Uneeda Doll, 373 F.2d at 852 (same); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A.
Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 277 (2d Cir. 1934)(same), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935);
Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (E.D. Va. 1985) (same); Doran v. Sunset House
Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 946 (S.D. Cal. 1961)(same); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel,
Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)(same).
161. See supra notes 10-138 and accompanying text (examining trend toward reasonable
construction of statutory notice requirement).
162. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (1976 Act contains more liberal notice
requirement than 1909 Act); supra notes 22-138 and accompanying text (precedent for prop-
osition that intent of notice requirement is to protect innocent infringers).
163. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (discussing goal of notice requirement
as protecting innocent infringer).
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